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This study builds on the work on community power structure 
which has evolved since the publication of the Lynds' Middletown. 
An empirical examination of the conflict over the proposed 
construction of the Orlando Utilities Commission's Curtis H. 
Stanton Energy Center is undertaken in the context of alternative 
~ 
hypotheses concerning the structure of power. 
The theoretical positions of the two major schools of 
community power structure--plural-elitist and single-elitist--
are examined. The orig~ns and arguments for the plant are 
presented, and the origins, tactics and counter-arguments of the 
opposition to the plant are also examined. The interaction and 
development of the conflict between the opposing strategies is 
then analyzed. 
This study concludes that in the case of the Stanton Energy 
Center, the single-elitist hypothesis was confirmed. A small, 
business-oriented elite, having control over major financial 
resources and access to the mass media, overwhelmed public 
advocacy groups which had a narrow base of support, few 
organizational and financial resources, and little cohesion. 
CHAPTER I 
THE ESSENCE OF POWER AND PARTICIPATION 
Introduction 
Describing what must be considered one of the most elusive 
of phenomena, Donald W. Harward (1982) states that: 
Power is sought and avoided, paraded and hidden, 
accumulated and lost. It can be desirable and 
offensive, enduring or ephemeral ... those who 
have it want it more, and those that don't have it 
want it more. (p. iv) 
Perhaps in no other aspect of life has this pervasive 
phenomemon been more explicitly studied than in community politics. 
·one need only consider the continuous flow of research generated by 
the quest to define power to fully appreciate the salience of this 
concept in explaining sociopolitical relations in any community. 
Much of this interest in the subject of community power stems 
from the debate over the extent to which an elite controls govern-
mental and community affai"rs. According to Rose (1967, p. 1) this 
debate can be traced at least as far back in American history as 
the political attacks of some Jeffersonian or some Hamiltonians at 
the end of the 18th century. "Scarcely any lower-class political 
movement in the United States has failed to express the theme that 
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the upper classes successfully used non-democratic means to thwart 
democratic processes. 11 The author further notes that Anarchism and 
Marxism, imports from Europe, also accept the theme as 
one of the basic elements of their ideologies. Not only 
do Marxists regard "the big economic man" as the true power 
holder, but they also view pre-socialist societies as 
involving the exploitation or dominance of one group over 
the other. 
For Marx, the relations of production were the most accurate 
indicators of who holds power in any community. Other scholars 
have traditionally tended to use participation in decision-making 
and control of key institutions as their operational definitions of 
power. There are also those scholars who combine both approaches 
in determining the nature of power. 
This study focuses on participation in decision-making as the 
major yardstick for measuring the concept of power. A case study 
approach is used to explore this question. The particular case 
examined is the decision of the Orlando Utilities Commission to 
build a multi-million dollar electrical plant, and the subsequent 
public political and legal battle by community forces which 
attempted to stop the building of the plant. 
Despite the rise of voca 1 oppos.i ti on, most of the affected 
populace remained quiescent throughout the public debate. Was 
the lack of widespread participation in the fight against the 
power plant the result of apathy, ignorance or indifference among 
the masses? Was there manipulation of the issue by those who 
control the decision-making machinery? What groups did arise and 
what strategies were employed by both opposition groups and those 
who supported the construction of the power plant in pursuit of 
their ends? 
This study explores the alternative hypothetical approaches 
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to power and the operational definitions employed by scholars. 
After" this, the present work examines the OUC controversy and 
ultimately explores the resolution of this conflict within the 
context of these models of power. Finally, conclusions are drawn 
concerning the most appropriate definition of power and strategy 
for empirically exploring the locus of power within this particular 
situation. 
Three Alternative Dimensions of Power 
There have been several major alternative views on dimensions 
of power. Steven Lukes, in his book, Power: A Radical View, 
summarizes what is termed the "three dimensions" of power. The 
first dimension, according to Lukes, (1974, pp. 20-38) is based on the 
traditional pluralists' approach, the second, essentially reflects 
Bachrach and Baratz's concept of power's "hidden face, 11 and the 
third originates with Lukes. 
The first view of power is what may be called the explicit, 
or 11 open 11 manifestation of power. One leading proponent of this 
dimension of power, the pluralist view, is Nelson Polsby. 
Polsby (1960) contends that: 
Nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any 
community ... If anything, there seems to be an 
unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at 
bottom nobody dominates in a town, so that their first 
question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?" 
but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?" 
Jhe first query is somewhat like, 11 Have you stopped 
beating your wife? 11 in that virtually any response short 
4 
of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers 
with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the 
stratification theory. (p. 479) 
Polsby's conception of power flows directly from the work of 
Max Weber and other traditional theorists. The presence of power, 
Weber ( 1947, p. 132) writes, is 11 the probability that one actor within 
a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will 
despite resistance, regardless of the basis upon which the 
probability rests." For Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950), 
"Power is participation in the making of decisions: G has power 
over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the 
making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H. 11 And both 
James MacGregor Burns and Bertrand Russell (1938, p. 35) define power 
simply as "the production of intended effects. 11 
Taking the latter's definition a little further, R. H. Tawney 
(1931, p. 230) describes power as 11 the capacity of an individual, or 
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group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals, 
or groups in the manner which he desires." Implying essentially 
the same relationship, Robert Dahl (1967), perhaps one of the 
foremost contemporary pluralist power theorists, states that "My 
intuitive idea of power is something like this: A has power over 
B to the extent he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do. 11 
' Floyd Hunter, . (1953, pp. 2-3) as a single-elite-power theorist, 
is usually viewed in opposition to Dahl, seems to agree with him in 
the sense that he argues that power describes "the acts of men 
going about the business of moving other men to act in relation 
to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things." 
Power, Hunter adds, "involves decision-making and it also involves 
the function of executing policies--or seeing to it that things 
get done which have been deemed necessary to be done. 11 
Expanding on Hunter's "relationship" concept, Polsby (1980, 
p. 4) states that degree of power is determined by 11 who 
participates, who gains or loses, and who prevails in decision-
making.11 Other scholars, including Jack Hirshleifer (1984, p. 506) 
share the view that power revolves around these important 
ingredients. 
But power, other theorists argue, is not confined to the 
overt activities in the decision-making arena. There is a more 
subtle, "hidden face, 11 marked by the manipulation of power 
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outcomes by those in advantageous positions, but not necessarily 
in 11 visible 11 form of control. One of the earliest proponents of 
this view of power, E. E. SchattsGhneider, (1960) argues that 11 It is 
profoundly characteristic that responsibility for the widespread 
non-participation is attributed wholly to ignorance, indifference 
and shiftlessness of the people." But Schattschneider continues: 
There is a better explanation: absenteeism reflects 
khe suppression of the options and alternatives that 
reflect the needs of the non-participants. It is not 
necessarily true that people with the greatest needs 
participate in politics most actively--whoever decides 
what the game is about decides who gets in the game. 
(p. 105) 
Taking his argument even further, Schattschneider 
contends that all forms of political organization have a basis 
in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the 
suppression of others because organization is the mobilization 
of bias some issues are organized into politics while others are 
organized out. Expressing a similar idea in different words, 
Michael Parenti (1970, p. 501) states that "One of the most important 
aspects of power is not to prevail in a struggle, but to 
predetermine the agenda of the struggle--to determine whether 
certain questions ever reach the competitive stage. 11 
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The concept of the "mobilization of basis" has been considered 
the brainchild of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who contend that there 
are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only 
one of which the political scientists see. The thrust of Bachrach 
and ·Baratz's argument is that one face of power manifests itself in 
the outcome of the "overt decision-making process," and the other 
face manifests itself in the capacity of individuals and groups to 
prevent issues or contests from arising which could threaten their 
interests. 
More specifically, the authors explain, the mobilization of 
bias represents 11 a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and 
institutional procedures--rules of the game--that operate 
systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons 
and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed 
in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests" 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). Bachrach and Baratz further argue that 
mobilization of bias not only may be wielded upon decision-making 
in political arenas, but it, in turn, is sustained primarily 
through "non-decisions." According to the authors: 
A non-decision ... is a decision that results in 
suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge 
to the values or interests of the decision-maker. To be 
more explicit, non-decision-making is a means by which 
demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits 
and privileges in the community can be suffocated before 
they are voiced, or kept covert; or killed before they 
gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, 
failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the 
decision-implementing stage of the policy process. 
(pp. 43-44) 
Perhaps more than anything else, the arguments advanced by 
proponents of power's second dimension have suggested that the 
exercrise of power is not confined to the decision-making arena, 
but extends to the issue-formation sphere and beyond. 
In fact, some theorists argue that power is so pervasive it 
penetrates the very social fabric of society, reducing the masses 
to a state of powerlessness and quiescence. Lukes (1974), the 
major exponent of this view, contends that there is a third 
dimension of power, the mechanisms of which are by far the least 
developed and least understood in political science. This third 
dimension involves acceptance of the dominant pattern of power 
by the subordinate groups in society. 
Identifying the traits of third-dimension power may include 
the study of social myths, language, and symbols, and how they 
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are shaped or manipulated in power processes. Furthermore, this 
"hidden face" of power may also be displayed in communication, and 
may involve as well a focus upon the means by which "social 
legitimations 11 are developed around the dominant, and instilled 
as beliefs or roles of the dominated. 
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Such processes, which serve to induce actions and beliefs that 
might not have otherwise developed. may take direct observable 
forms. "One does not have to go to the lengths of talking about 
Brave New World, or the world of B. F. Skinner to see this, 11 
Lukes argues (1974, p. 23). "Thought control takes many less total 
and more mundane forms, through the control of information, through the 
mass media, and through the process of socialization-. 11 
Apart from these information-control processes, other more 
indirect means by which power alters political conceptions have 
been identified. Among them, Gaventa explains, are psychological 
adaptations to the state of being powerless, especially for highly 
deprived or vulnerable groups. 
Ira Katznelson (1973) and Walter Karpin (1974) among others, 
argue that a sense of powerlessness may manifest itself as 
"extensive fatalism, self-depreciation, or undue apathy about 
one's situation. It may, according to Friere (1972, p. 3) also lead 
to "a greater susceptibility to the internalization of values, beliefs, 
or rules of the game of the powerful as a further adaptive response." 
The Debate Over an 11 0perational 11 Definition of Power 
There is no consensus on the theoretical meaning of power, 
and there is also a lack of a standard broadly-accepted definition 
to guide empirical examinations of power. 
Among the numerous competing theoretical definitions currently 
guiding empirical research on power are those espoused by the 
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elitist theories of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert 
Michels and their disciples. Sidney Hooks (1978) explains that: 
In every society the actual laws, and the exercise of 
power are derived not from the thoughts, passions and will 
of the many, but from the decisions of an elite few in 
legislative, judicial, and executive roles. Therefore, 
democracy is a myth, majority rule an empty shibboleth, 
and all political change consists in a succession of power 
elites. (p. 14) 
Mosca et al. contend that order is possible without a 11 political 
class 11 --a politically dominant class, the class of a minority. 
Expanding on this view, Michels (1962) states that "the 
eternal struggles" between aristocracy and democracy have never 
been anything more than struggles between an old minority, defending 
its actual predominance and a new and ambitious minority, intent 
upon the conquest of power, desiring either to fuse with the 
former or to dethrone and replace it. 
The scenario described by Michels is referred to as "The 
Iron Law of Oligarchy. 11 Applying this law specifically to 
voluntary organizations seeking to alter aristocratic power, 
Michels (1962, p. 342) explains that "The initial need for strong 
leadership within the organization leads to the adoption of 
'militaristic ideas and methods'" In attempting to build power 
to combat the external situation, the reform organization develops 
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oligarchic tendencies. The oligarchic power in turn has effects 
upon the consciousness of the powerholders, leading to a belief in 
their own superiority. 
The theory that power in any community rests in the hands of 
a select few has also been stated by C. W. Mills. In his celebrated 
work, The Power Elite, Mills (1956, p. 324) posits that the 
existence of an 11 omnipotent, cohesive" society-wide elite--the 
... 
power elite. "The top of American society is increasingly unified, 
and often seems well coordinated: at the top there has emerged an 
elite of power. 11 
According to Mills, (pp. 3-9) this elite comprises "corporate 
chief, political directors, and Pentagon warlords ... men whose 
positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of 
ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions 
having major consequences." Mills also claims that this triangle 
of political, economic and military elite is 11 an intricate set 
of overlapping cliques," in command of the major hierarchies and 
organizations of modern society. 
In addition, Mills contends that the middle levels of 
power--legislators and interest groups--are adrift and competitive. 
The masses at the bottom of the pyramidal power structure are 
atomized and powerless. 
Like Mills, James Meisel (1958, p. 4) argues that community power 
is concentrated in the hands of an elite. Presenting his case in 
what is now referred to as the "three-Cs concept"--group 
consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy--Meisel states that 
elite rule implies "the collective manipulation of the masses 
by a small 1 eadershi p group or by severa 1 such groups. 11 "We 
will assume," Meisel continues, "that all the members of the 
elite are alert to their group interests; that this alertness 
is in turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or explicit, 
of gr®up or class solidarity; and at last, that this solidarity 
is expressed in a common will of action." 
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Among other political theorists who share the elitist concept 
of power are Geoffrey Roberts and Harold Lasswell. In every 
"social collectivity, 11 ·Roberts (1971, p. 79) writes, there is a 
minority which 11 exerci ses a preponderant influence within the 
collectivity."· Concurring with Roberts, Lasswell (1961, p. 66) states 
that "the political elite comprises the power holders of a body 
politic." According to Lasswell, the powerholders include the leader-
ship and social formations which the leaders typically come to and 
which accountability is maintained during the given generation. "In 
other words," Lasswell explains, "the political elite is the top 
power class." 
In contrast to this school, the "pluralist theorists," 
foremost among them contemporary pluralist Robert Dahl, argue 
that single-elite theorists have introduced a major flaw into 
their conceptions of "ruling elite." The controlling group 
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identified by single-elite theorists, Dahl (1967, p. 211) contends, 
has been treated as 11 a pure artifact of democratic rule. 11 According to 
Dahl, any controlling group that is a product of rules that are 
actually followed in social setting, in which a majority of 
individuals could dominate if they pursued certain courses of 
action permissible under the "real" rule, sho'uld be excluded from 
the definition of ruling elite. 
"'A ruling elite, then, 11 Dahl (1967) writes, 11 is a controlling 
group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of 
democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preference 
regularly prevails in cases of differences in preferences on key 
political issues." 
In his classic study of New Haven "Who Governs?, 11 Dahl (1961, 
pp. 101-102) concludes that the typical U.S. community is not a mono-
1 ith, but rather a pluralistic system. In New Haven Dahl reportedly 
found a "highly pluralistic system," characterized by "stubborn 
and pervasive ambiguity, 11 in which both leaders and led, drawn from 
many strata of the community and occupying diverse roles, both led 
and were led, and in which it was necessary to distinguish "direct" 
influences--possessed by relatively few-- from 11 indirect 11 --possessed by 
a great many. 
The variations in the foregoing ·definitions for "ruling 
elite, 11 underscore two crucial problems, Zuckerman (1977) 
contends. First, he points out that different labels are often 
used to refer to the same concept; and secondly, different 
concepts are covered by the same label. Defining the political 
elite as those who control "real effective power, 11 Zuckerman 
argues, generates the question of exactly how does one ascertain 
who they are. To this question Dahl (1967, p. 269) answers that 
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"the 'real 1 political elite is so powerful as to be hidden from view. 11 
According to Dahl, the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling 
elite rcan be strictly tested only if: (i) the hypothetical ruling 
elite is a well-defined group; (ii) there is a fair sample of cases 
involving key political discussions in which the preferences of the 
hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely 
group that might be suggested; and (iii) in such cases, the 
preferences of the elite regularly prevail. 
These defining characteristics, Zuckerman (1977, p. 332) contends, 
are "so numerous and the requirements of testing are so stringent that 
it is scarcely possible that the 'data container' ruling elite 
will ever be filled." Besides, Zuckerman contends that the use 
of cohesion as a defining characteristic may indicate the 
normative concerns of the analysts and serve as a source of 
confusion • 
Perhaps more than anything else though, the foregoing 
presentation of exclusive or conflicting operational definitions 
of power and elitism underline the common inclination among 
social scientists to view societies as asymmetrical in the 
distribution of political power. Furthermore, it highlights the 
fact that scholars of community power have been polarized into 
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· two distinct schools of thought. Commenting on this phenomenon, 
David M. Ricci (1970) states that there are those social scientists 
who tend to find at least "several competing centers 11 of local or 
national power. Other students of community power tend to find a 
11 tight~y-knit 11 stru~ture of leadership--a ruling stratum--wherever 
they investigate. However, according to Frederick Frey (1971, p. 1101), 
11 More precise empirical analysis of the character of the U.S. local 
po 1itica1 e 1 i te is required. 11 
Some Landmark Empirical Case Studies 
Despite the disagreement over an operational definition for 
power, most power theorists seem to share the view that ·elites 
are crucially important political actors, if indeed, they do exist. 
Building on the foundation of speculation and empirical analysis 
established by Mosca, Michels, Pareto, Weber ~nd others, Lasswell 
(1958, p. 13) himself an early investigator of elites, claims that 
11 the study of po 1 it i cs is the study of influence and the 
influential 11 --society'.s elites, who enjoy the bulk of society's 
valued products. 
Robert and Helen Lynd, (1937) in their well-known studies of 
Muncie, Indiana (Middletown), reached basically the same conclusion. 
They contend that in the Middletown of 1925 the 11 dominant interests" 
in the community were those of the business class. For decades 
Middletown had been controlled by "a small business elite" 
which in turn was dominated by one family. The power of this 
"business class," the Lynds (p. 97) argue, was based on the 
"pervasiveness of the long fingers of capitalist ownership," and 
"the economic life of the city 11 --particularly on the ability 
of this group to control the extension of credit. The business-
control group, according to the Lynds, was comprised of local 
manufacturers, bankers, the local head managers of national 
corporations with units in Middletown and "one or two outstanding 
lawyers." 
As for the typical city official, the Lynds describe him as 
a "man of meager caliber," and as "the man whom the inner business 
group ignore economically and socially and use political.ly. 11 
Elaborating on this relationship between businessmen and 
politicians, the Lynds state that: 
The professional politician in a city like Middletown 
occupies in reality a position somewhat apart. He is 
not ordinarily a person accepted in the inner councils 
of the business class, and yet he must work with it in 
order to get anywhere. And on the other hand, the 
business class have ... little respect for local 
politics and politicians, viewing them as necessary 
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evils which business supports and controls only 
enough to ensure corporation in necessary matter. 
(o. 329) 
Additionally, the Lynds report that the lines of leadership 
and the related controls are highly concentrated. "Middletown 
has ... at present what amounts to a reigning royal family. The 
power of this family has become so great as to differentiate the 
... 
city today somewhat .from cities with a more diffuse type of 
control." 
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Using the comments of a Middletown resident, the Lynds further 
dramatize the magnitude of control exercised by this particular 
family: 
If I'm out of work, I g·o to X plant; if I need money, 
I go to X bank, and if they don't like me I don't get 
it; my children go to X college; when I get sick, I 
go to X hospital; I buy a building lot or house in an 
X subdivision; my wife goes downtown to buy clothes at 
X department store ... I read the news from X morning 
paper; and, if I am rich enough, I travel via the X 
airport. (p. 74) 
Regional City (Atl~nta, Georgia) 
Joining the Lynds in their quest to empirically define 
community power is Floyd Hunter, unquestionably one of the fore-
most proponents of the stratification/elitist theory. 
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Hunter's classic study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia), 
probably has generated more controversy on the subject of community 
power than any other similar effort. Not only has this work 
occasioned the seemingly endless furor in political circles, but 
it has also played a pivotal role in revitalizing and bringing new 
meaning to the study of the contemporary community power. 
Supporting this view, Polsby (1980, p. 45) states, 11 Just as the 
... 
Middletown books mark both the beginning and the high point of an 
earlier era in the study of community power, the work of Floyd 
Hunter dominates the contemporary scene. 11 For although 
numerous critics have underscored what they consider 
methodological pitfalls, Hunter's (1953) examination of leadership 
and power relations in Regional City remains a major point of 
reference for much of today's power-related research. 
In keeping with the traditional stratification theory, 
Hunter (p. 79) contends that Regional City was run by 11 a small group of 
powerful men who interacted socially and determined policy 
informally and behind the scenes. The test for admission to 
this circle of decisionmakers, is almost wholly a man's 
position in the business community in Regional City. 11 Political 
and civic leaders, Hunter explains, were subordinate to the 
economic-based power elite, which made basic policy decisions. 
Even the governor of the state was controlled by economic 
interests, Hunter states. 11 As the investigation proceeded, it 
became apparent that an economic elite member was the power 
behind the governor. 0 Like the governor, other politicians 
were subordinated to the economic power elite, Hunter 
contends. Also, he outlines a "division of labor" in which the 
topmost leaders, comprising of men with important economic 
connections, made basic policy decisions. "The men in the 
understructure of power become the doers and are activated 
by the..-policymakers--the initiators, 11 Hunter (p. 100) writes. 
He also states that: 
Membership in the top brackets of one of the stable 
economic bureaucracies is the surest road to power, 
and this road is entered into by only a few. 
Organizational leaders are prone to get the publicity; 
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the upper echelon economic leaders the power. (pp. 86-87) 
Additionally, Hunter claims that the dominance of the economic 
elite in Regional City was most strongly reflected in public 
policy, and that any perceived challenge to the status quo in 
Regional City was counteracted with warnings, intimidations, threats, 
and in extreme cases, violence. He further contends that in 
instances the method of suppressing challenge may have included 
isolation from all sources of support for the individual, 
including his job, and therefore his income. 
The principle of divide and rule, Hunter claims, was as 
applicable in the community as it was in larger units of political 
patterning. 
New Haven, Connecticut 
The New Haven study by Dahl (1961) aimed specifically at 
explaining events relating to the making and executing of public 
·policy in several issue areas, including public education, urban 
redevelopment and political nominations. Like the Lynds, Hunter 
and other power theorists, Dahl's ultimate goal was to determine 
if anyone governed in the community, and if so, who. 
A~ previously mentioned, Dahl contends that New Haven was 
run by no one particular group, but rather by many different 
groups. In the three issue areas he examined, for example, 
Dahl reportedly finds "little overlap" among elites in these areas 
of public controversy and decision-making. With each area, he 
finds that leaders and subleaders are recruited to provide 
support and legitimacy for public decisions within the specialized 
constituencies affected by these policies. 11 Equilibrium or balance 
is provided by New Haven's Mayor Richard C. Lee, who integrates 
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these quasi-independent coalitions in support of his administration's 
programs." Lee, according to Dahl (pp. 200-205), operated as a 
"broker or middleman;" and was the focal point of an 11 executive-
centered11 set of coalitions or alliances. 
Although Dahl contends that a distant political stratum 
exists, he did emphasize that these elites were penetrable, 
heterogenous, and often disagree on issues. In addition, Dahl 
(p. 72) claims that there was no such thing as a "covert elite of 
economic notables, 11 directing public policy in New Haven. 
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Instead, decisions rested with New Haven's executive, Governor Lee, 
who is an elected official "theoretically" responsible to the 
electorate. 
"In talking with a good many businessmen in New Haven I have 
found that even with respect -to decisions in which they have 
participated, often they are extremely vague as to what actually 
transpired," Dahl (1967, p. 144) writes. The author therefore 
refutes any suggestion that businessmen dominate community policies 
f' 
in New Haven. According to Dahl, New Haven, like most communities, 
had a community fund drive that was carried on mainly by young 
businessmen who were looking for a chance to "make a mark as go-
getters" and to acquire some recognition and prestige. 
As for public schools, these institutions were dominated not 
by businessmen, but other groups, Dahl (1967, p. 144) contends. 
According to the author, "If there is anything in the community 
in which businessmen are involved in it is urban redevelopment." 
Yet by and large New Haven's businessmen did not even dominate 
this area of community life. It was the "strong" executive, 
Mayor Dilworth or Mayor Lee, who provided the leadership on 
redevelopment. 
In summarizing his findings on New Haven Dahl emphasizes 
that citizens do not rule the system as political equals, neither 
does a unified elite control decisions, ar least not in New Haven. 
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Therefore, "In a political system where nearly every adult may vote 
but knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and 
other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?" 
(Dahl, 1961, p. 1). 
Appalachia's Clear Fork Valley 
Gaventa's (1980) empirical study of Clear Fork Valley, Appalachia, 
contrasts sharply with Dahl's pluralist analysis of New Haven. 
Gaventa's Clear Fork Valley is characterized by "stark 
incongruity 11 --the coexistence of massive natural wealth, chiefly 
coal and land, and pervasive human poverty. Besides, unemployment 
limited education, malnutrition, coal mining hazards, and 
ecological ruin play havoc amid the abundance of wealth. "This 
has been the region's status quo under decades of domination by a 
British company and its absentee owners. Despite these desperate 
conditions and frequently violent union struggles ... acquiescence 
to this status quo has been maintained" (Wood, introduction to Gaventa). 
In his attempt to explain the sociopolitical· atrocities in 
Clear Fork Valley, Gaventa states that: 
In situations of inequality, the political response of the 
deprived may be seen as a function of power relationships. 
Power works to develop and maintain the quiescence of the 
powerless. Rebellion, as a corollary, may emerge as 
power relationships are altered. Together, patterns 
of power and powerlessness can keep issues from arising 
grievances from being voiced, and interests from being 
recognized. (pp. vi-vii) 
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According to the author, this has been the situation in Clear 
Fork Va 11 ey. A sma 11, but powerful, group of i ndi vi duals contra 1 
the community's major economic, political and social institutions, 
which are virtually impenetrable and closed to the masses. 
Based on this finding, Gaventa (p. 41) has rejected 
pluralist rmethodology as a feasible alternative for analyzing 
community power structure. "By assuming an open system in which 
people could participate and would if they had grievances, this 
view (the pluralist's) must place explanation for non-
participation in value-laden allegations about non-participants 
themselves. 11 
The opportunity for p~rticipation in decision-making in Clear 
Fork Valley was, at the time Gaventa did his study, non-existent. 
Like Hunter's Regional City, perceived challenge to Clear Fork 
Valley's status quo, Gaventa states, was met with warnings, intimi-
dations, threats, and in some cases violence. Therefore, the 
"culture of silence 11 developed and sustained in this region must 
not be blamed on the political inefficacy, cynicism, ignorance, or 
apathy of the masses--the powerlessness--but rather on the strong 
influence of the power-weilding elite. Like Hunter and the Lynds, 
Gaventa (p. 41) contends that community power, at least in Clear 
Fork Valley, is of "a hierarchical, clearly stratified nature. 11 
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Critique and Summary of the Pluralist, Elitist Theories 
Apart from noting that the Lynds' study is the 11 01 de st sti 11-
standi ng landmark" among community studies, Polsby (1980, p. 14) also 
contends that this classic work is unique, and in many ways the best 
in ·its category. According to Polsby, all five generations 
which characterize stratification analyses of community power are 
set forth in the Lynds' research, "accompanied by a wealth of 
circumstantial detail." 
These generalizations to which the author refers are that 
stratification theorists contend that (i) the upper class rules 
in local community life; (ii) political and civic leaders are 
subordinate to the upper class; (iii) the upper-class power elite 
rules in its own interest; (iv) social conflict takes place between 
the upper and lower classes; and (v) a single rules in the 
community (Polsby, 1980, pp. 8-13). 
Unlike the elitists, pluralists claim that in any given 
society several pyramids of power are likely to exist simultan-
eously. Alex de Tocqueville, according to Polsby, (p. 118) views 
society as "a congeries of infinite small special interest groups, with 
widely differing power bases, and a multitude of techniques for 
exercising influence on decisions salient tothem. 11 Similarly, 
Polsby (1959, p. 235) himself states that "Presumably people partici-
pate in those areas they care about most. Their values, eloquently 
expressed by their participation cannot, it seems to me, be more 
effectively objectified." 
But from the elitists' standpoint, such views are a warped 
perception of the realities of community power structure. By 
focusing on behavior--doing, participation--and not upon sources 
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of power, pluralists assume that decision-making arenas, in which 
participation is likely to occur, are accessible to everyone, 
Gaventa states. A glaring example of this assumption is Polsby 1 s 
(1980, p. 118) assertion that 11 in the decision-making of fragmented 
government ... the claims of small intense minorities are usually 
attended to. 11 
Also alluding to the accessibility of the decision-making 
process is Hooks (1979, p. 15) who contends that in democracies, 
there are 11 plural sources of opinion, 11 greater interplay 
and interactions, more input from more sources, and at 
the very least, a legally recognized opposition to the positions 
expressed by the official holders of power. 
In addition to assuming that groups and individuals have 
ample access to the decision-making arena, pluralists, by using 
participation as the yardstick for measuring power, also presume 
that grievances are recognized and acted upon. However, 
as Gaventa and others have deomonstrated, a mobilization 
of bias may not only preempt participation, but 
also create 11 a culture of silence 11 --the thwarting of the develop-
ment of consciousness among the powerless, thus lending to the 
dominant order an air of legitimacy. 
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In support of this opinion Hawley and Wirt (1974, p. 172) 
argue that it has been erroneously assumed that power is solely 
reflected in concrete decisions. Dahl, these authors claim, 
excludes the possibility that in the community in question there 
might have been a group capable of preventing contests from arising 
on issues of importance to it. Beyond that, however, by ignoring 
the "less apparent face of power, 11 Dahl and those who accept his 
plural is~ approach are unable to adequately differentiate between 
a 11 key 11 and a "routine 11 political decision. 
Continuing their criticism of Dahl's work, Hawley and Wirt 
(1974) claim that in conceiving of elite domination exclusively in 
the form of a conscious cabal 11 exercising the power of decision-
making and vetoeing, he [Dahl] overlooks a more subtle form of 
domination; one in which those who actually dominate are not 
conscious of it themselves, simply because their position of 
dominance has never seriously been challenged. 
In addition to viewing community power structure as 
polylithic in nature, pluralists also hold that power may be 
tied to persistent issues, provoking coalitions among interested 
groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to 
semi-permanent. "To presume that the set of coalitions which 
exist in the community at any given tim~ is a timelessley stable 
aspect of social structure is to introduce inaccuracies into one's 
description of social reality 11 (Polsby, 1960, p. 476). 
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John F. Manley is one of the most recent, and perhaps most 
severe critic of the pluralist doctrine. In an article titled 
11 Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II, 11 
Manley (1983, p. 368) claims that, like his colleagues, Dahl has 
failed 11 to account for the reality of political and economic 
inequality in the United States. 11 
In the past several years, however, political and economic 
developments in the United States have "placed the pluralist 
paradigm under a good deal of strain, 11 Manley notes. 11 Even 
inside the pluralist school, serious doubts have arisen about the 
theory's ability to explain the American system 11 (Manley, 1983, p. 368). 
Manley contends as well that, despite the "generally 
favorable response" to pluralists' critique of elitism and class 
analysis, "strong doubts" have arisen, too, about the relationship 
between pluralism and such central issues of democratic theory 
as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful social change. 
One major consequence of these developments in the pluralist 
camp is what Manley (p. 369) describes as the movement to the 11 left 11 of 
leading pluralists such as Dahl and Lindblom. These two men, 
Manley contends, probably have done more than anyone else in the 
past 30 years to modernize the theory of pluralism. "Dahl and 
Lindblom have been so disturbed by the system's performance that 
they have issued radical-sounding calls for major structural 
reforms and redistribution of wealth and income, and have even 
questioned the capitalist system itself. 11 
As a result of this "leftward movement," Manley explains, 
scholars of community power now talk of a theory called 11 new 11 
or 11 postpluralism. 11 According to Manley, the modifications 
advocated for the original pluralist theory are so profound 
that one can clearly see the evolution of a new theory--
Plural ism II--constantly eating away at the very foundation upon 
which the former doctrine--Pluralism I--rests. 
"Pluralism II now calls into serious question much of what 
generations of American political scientists have taught and 
believed is true about pluralist democracy in the United States 11 
(p. 369). Despite this development, Manley suggests that what 
is needed is not Pluralism II, but rather a new non-pluralistic 
theory that better fits the realities of political and economic 
power in the United States. 
Indications are that the debate on power and the related 
elitist/pluralist controversy will continue through the 20th 
century and beyond. This study makes no attempt to lay to 
rest this long-standing issue. However, it is hoped that 
the numerous theories and findings presented in this chapter 
will at least provide the background against which an 
objective analysis of the case of the OUC coal-fired plant 
can be made. 
The finding of a local power elite, deciding the fate of a 
major energy project and its effects on thousands of customers, 
might not be the most earthshaking empirical revelation of this 
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work. Undoubtedly, though, the case in question will not only 
facilitate better understanding of the concepts discussed, but in 
addition, it will generate further inquiry into the nature of 
community politics--how issues develop or are prevented from 
developing, who participates, who gains from a decision, who 
prevails in decision-making, and how they prevail. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE OUC CASE FOR A NEW COAL-FIRED PLANT 
The OUC System Description 
The OUC operates, maintains and controls the electric and 
power utilities serving the city of Orlando and portions of the 
metropolitap area outside the city limits. Presently, the system 
is served by the Highland and Indian River gas and oil-fired plants, 
two combustion turbines located at Lake Highland and a 13-megawatt 
share of the Crystal River nuclear plant. The system's total 
electrical output is 750 megawatts. The OUC transmission system 
consists of 15 substations, 181 miles of high-voltage transmission 
line and cable, 792 miles of primary distribution line and cable, 
and five high-voltage interconnections with other utilities (OUC, 
1981, p. 1, 1-1). 
The OUC generating units, which are 98 percent dependent on 
oil and natural gas for fuel, served an average of 74,200 
residential customers and 10,300 general-service customers in 
19~0 (OUC, 1981, p. 2). According to OUC's classification, the 
general-service demand sector, which is the utility's largest 
sector, is composed mainly of large commercial customers, 
i n c 1 u di n g a 11 few 11 heavy i n dust r i a 1 users . I n 19 80 , c omme re i al 
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customers accounted for 49 percent of OUC's energy sales, the 
residential sector, the second largest user of OUC's power, 
accounted for approximately 42 percent of the utility's 
electricity. The remaining 9 percent of the power generated 
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by the system was bought by small commercial enterprises--general-
service-nondemand sector (OUC, 1981, p. 2). 
Establishing Need for Additional Capacity 
Convinced that OUC'~ existing generating capacity would not 
be adequate to meet future energy demands in the Orlando area, 
OUC consulting engineers, Black and Veatch, which had previously 
undertaken 11 long-range 11 power-need studies for the utility in 
1978, recommended that the Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center be 
bu i 1 t. 
Like similar studies conducted in previous years, the study 
from which the Stanton plant idea evolved, was designed to 
appraise the electricity demands of the utility's service area, 
assess the company's ability to meet these demands·, and most 
importantly, to explore possibilities of providing customers with 
a more reliable and cheaper source of power than those currently 
being used. After an "exhaustive analytic process," Black 
and Veatch,' OUC consultants for over 30 years, recommended 
the construction of a new coal-fired plant as the most viable 
alternative to existing oil-burning facilities (H. Smith, 
personal communication, January 23, 1985). 
According to OUC spokesman Harold Smith, the Black and 
Veatch decision was largely influenced by the rapid growth 
predicted for the Orlando area, and the state of Florida in 
general. 11 Growth was not an issue years ago; not so anymore," 
Smith said. Besides, the increased volatility of the oil 
market since the mid-1970s further convinced the OUC consultants 
that a switch from oil to coal would not only be cheaper but also 
be more rel table, Smith explains (Smith, personal communication, 
January 23, 1985) discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
The "exhaustive analytic" study undertaken by the Kansas-
based Black and Veatch firm, involved the use of a "complex, 
sophisticated end-use model. 11 In general, the 11 end-use 11 
met~odology requires breaking down the load into customer classes 
and end uses, and projecting future loads based on changes in 
number of customers, end uses and energy usage patterns. For 
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each customer class and end use, load projections were made for the 
years 1981 through 2000 (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-2). 
These projections, according to OUC, took into consideration 
factors such as growth in number of customers in each class, 
change in saturation rate for each end use, increases in appliance 
efficiencies, improvement in home and business insulation and 
weatherization, and other conservation me~sures expected to be 
voluntarily employed by customers. 
Equally fundamental to the OUC forecast was the Florida 
Public Service Commission 1 s conservation goals, which primarily 
call for programs to reduce the use of oil by 25 percent by 
1989 (OUC, 1981, p. 1, 2-1). 
But perhaps the dominant force determining the outcome of 
the OUC power analyses was what the commission describes as a 
11 reliability requirement. 11 This requirement states that OUC 
must mainta~n a minimum of 25 percent reserve energy at all times, 
a company official explains. Using the historical annual load 
growth of 4.4 percent for the 1971 through 1980 period, OUC 
officials contended that the reserve margin would drop below 
the required level by 1987, and by 1992 it would be insufficient 
to meet peak demand with any of the three largest OUC units out 
of service (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-1). 
11 As the OUC system peak demands have grown and the reserve 
margins of neighborhood utilities have shrunk, an adequate 
reserve margin has become a necessity, both to supply reliable 
power to OUC customers and to maintain inter-ties with other 
utilities 11 (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 1-1). 
Reliability analyses performed with RELCOMP, a nationally-
recognized reliability computer system, revealed that OUC 
peak demand has grown substantially--at an average annual 
increase of 8.3 percent--over the last 20 years, compared to 
an annual 4.4 percent prior to the early 1960s. According 
to RELCOMP, peak demand in summer 1960 stood at 102 megawatts, 
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while in winter 1980 it was 500 megawatts. And although peak 
demand varies widely due to extreme weather conditions and 
customer reactions at the time of peak, OUC forecasters 
predicted that the increasing trend will continue. Table 1 
provides detailed illustration of OUC 1 s historical peak demand 
and net system of energy. 
These rising demands, Black and Veatch concluded, could be 
adequately met by building a coal-fueled generator station, the 
Stanton Energy Center. This decision, according to an OUC 
spokesman, came after their consultants considered several 
different alternatives to oil-generating electricity. 
Among other things, Black and Veatch considered expansion 
of the OUC oil-burning Indian River plant, an alternative that 
would violate the 1978 Federal Power and Industrial Fuel Act, 
which prohibits the building of new power plants using natural 
gas or oil as primary fuels. Purchasing power from other 
utilities, converting existing oil-burning units to burn 100 
percent coal as well as coal-oil mixture, and using advanced 
technologies to reduce energy consumption were other alternatives 
examined (OUC, 1981, p. 4, 5-1). 
A nuclear plant, an OUC official explains, was ruled out as 
a viable alternative "because it would be extremely costly." 
Cost overruns for nuclear plants are usually in the billions, 
the OUC spokesman states. The exorbitant prices have been 
attributed to 11 regulatory delays and lack of a clear natio~al 
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TABLE 1 
HISTORICAL PEAK DEMAND AND NET SYSTEM ENERGY 
Summer Net Winter 
Peak System Load Peak 
Year Demand Energy** Factor*** Winter Demand 
MW GWH percent MW 
1971 310 1,480 54.4 1971-72 270 
1972 352 , 1,677 54.4 1972-73 342 
1973 400 1,893 54.0 1973-74 363 
1974 379 1,787 53.8 1974-75 345 
1975 385 1,867 55.4 1975-76 410 
1976 406 1,919 54.0 1976-77 468 
1977 435 2,055 53.9 1977-78 430 
1978 433 2,149 56.7 1978-79 454 
1979 452 2,207 55.7 1979-80 500 
1980 487 2,329 '54.6 1980-81 535 
**Net system energy is composed of OUC customer consumption plus 
system losses. 
***Based on summer peak demand. 
Source: OUC, 11 Need for Power. 11 
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policy regarding the role of nuclear power in our country." 
To support this claim, OUC noted that since 1972, 100 nuclear 
plants have been cancelled, and that no new ones started since 
1978 (Smith, personal communication, January 23, 1985). 
In a recent article titled, "Nuclear Follies" James Cook 
(1985) contends: 
The failure of the U.S. nuclear power programs ranks as 
the l~rgest managerial disaster in business history, a 
disaster on a monumental scale. The utility industry 
has already invested $125 billion in nuclear power, with 
an additional $140 billion to come before the decade is 
out, and only the ·blind, or the biased, can now think 
that most of the money has been well spent. It is a 
defeat for the U.S. consumer and for the comptetitiveness 
of U.S. industry, for the utilities that undertook the 
program and for the private enterprise system that made 
it possible. Without even recognizing the risks, the 
U.S. e 1 ectri c power industry undertook a commitment 
bigger than the space program ($100 billion) or Vietnam 
($111 billion) and in little more than a decade, 
transformed what elsewhere in the world is a low-cost, 
reliable, environmentally impeccable ·form of energy into 
a power source that is not only ·high in cost and 
unreliable but perhaps not even safe. (p. 83) 
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The foregoing analyses, plus the results of individual 
evaluations and economic comparisons of the various alternatives 
which convinced the OUC consultants that their proposed Plan I, 
which includes the installation of the Stanton Energy Unit by 
1987, "is the lowest cost alternative for the OUC system." The 
next lowest cost alternative on a "cumulative present-worth 
basis" was plan III, which includes the conversion of Indian 
River Unit III to burn coal. According to Black and Veatch, the 
cumulative present-worth costs for Plan III are 4.6 percent 
greater than those of Pl.an I on an annual basis (OUC, 1981, p. 5, 
0-1). 
According to company sources, OUC plans to install an 
additional three units as needed to the Stanton Energy Center 
over the next 20 years. The additions will boost the system's 
total electrical output to 2,000 megawatts. 
OUC's Justification for Building the Stanton Power Center 
Apart from underscoring the economic advantages of 
switching from oil to coal-generated power, OUC and its 
consultants enumerated several other reasons . the change of energy 
source was necessary. Growth, fuel independence, fuel diversity, 
firm capacity, and plant replacement were delineated as 
reasons which justified the building of the Stanton Center. 
Noting that Orlando is among the 50 largest metropolitan 
areas in the United States today, OUC officials argue that a 
facility like Stanton was needed to ensure an ample supply of 
cheap energy to meet anticipated increase in electricity demands. 
This projected rise in power demand was predicated upon rapid 
growth. Orlando, OUC officials contend, is one of the fastest-
growing areas in the nation, and is "already being hailed as an 
emerging premiere." Besides, the city is 11 in the middle of" one 
of the fastest growing states, a state predicted to have the third 
largest population in the nation by the year 2001. "There is no 
question that the plant is needed for growth," officials conclude 
(OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5). 
OUC also argues that if adequate preparation were not made 
for the anticipated growth, there would be power shortages in its 
service area by 1991. Therefore, to ward off this impending 
danger, and to satisfy state requirement of maintaining a 25 
percent reserve capacity, the utility decided to move with full 
speed to build the coal-fired plant. According to OUC officials, 
the utility is currently "deficient in firm capacity at times 
of peak demand. 11 If its large unit went out, the OUC system 
would have to buy power at "tremendously increased" costs to 
customers (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5). 
Another reason cited as justification for building the 
Stanton Energy Center is fue 1 diversity, which wil 1 11 enab1 e OUC 
to take advantage of market conditions and· base its power supply 
on the most economical fuel mix" (OUC Bulletin, 1981, p. 5). 
In addition to the need for fuel diversity, the new coal-
fired plant, OUC officials claim·, was a necessary replacement 
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for some of the utility•s existing facilities which will soon be 
obsolete. Already, OUC has shut down its Lake Highland power 
plant operation, and the Indian Ri ver generating unit, which has 
a l ife expectancy of 30 years, will be 28 years old when Stanton 
goes into operation in 1987 (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 5). 
Economic Benefits 
Perhaps the most convincing arguments advanced by OUC as 
' justification for construe-ting the Stanton Center are those 
revolving around economic benefits. In fact, when the Florida 
Public Service Commi"ssion (FPSC) certif i ed the need for the pl.ant, 
it explained that the primary reason it had given OUC the 
permission to begfn construction of the power facility was 
because of the "s i gni fi cant economic benefits 11 that woul. d result 
from the project. 11 ••• While it was not likely that the new 
plant would result in 'an absolute 1 reduction in rates, the 
electrical bills would be lower than they would be if Stanton 
were not constructed or if any other alternative were exercised," 
FPSC stated (OUC Bulletin, 1984, p. 9). 
According to the FPSC--the federal agency responsible for 
plant certification--the Stanton Energy Center would benefit not 
only OUC customers, but also peninsular Florida by providing 11 an 
alternative to costly oil-fired power. 11 Fuel oil, OUC officials 
state, now costs 10 times more than it did in 1973 before the oil 
embargo staged by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Last summer, for example, residual fuel cost 
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$29.25 a barrel. 11 That price would have to drop $12 or $13 a 
barrel--more than half--for the price of oil to be as low as the 
delivered price of coal purchased for the new plant" (Ibid, p. 5). 
OUC cost estimates further indicate that the new coal-fired plant 
is· expected to displace 3.75 million barrels of oil annually, and 
that each trainload of coal for the Stanton plant is expected to 
save approximately $500,000 in fuel costs. This means that by 
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1987, annual savings to the OUC system, due to the installation of 
Stanton Energy Center Unit I, should range from $10 million in the 
first year to $57 million in 1991. These savings in fuel costs will 
be passed on directly to OUC's 92,000 consumers (OUC Bulletin, 1984, 
p. 9). 
According to an Orlando Sentinel article, this large dollar 
amount translates into a savings of $14.41 a month for the typical 
residential customer in the first year of Stanton's operation, and 
to $56.40 per month by 1991. However, in 1978 when OUC made these 
projections, oil prices were higher than they were when construction 
of the power plant began years later. Therefore, with falling oil 
prices, the utility's projected savings have shrunk. OUC now admits 
that instead of 1987, customers will not see a reduction of their 
electricity bulls until after 1989, and these savings will be small 
compared with the original projections--$2 .. 67 on a monthly bill in 
1989 (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983, 
p. Al, A14). The projected residual fuel-oil and delivered-coal prices 
from 1981 to 2000 are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
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The oil-price projections are based on OUC's actual 1980 cost of 
$3.5MBtu and estimated escalation. Real escalation--price 
movements relative to the general rate of inflation--for the 
1980 through 2000 period is the same as that used in "Forecast 
Analysis Fuel" in 1980 for Tampa Electrical Company, OUC sources 
indicated (OUC, 1981, p. Bl, 2-1). 
Noting that precise future price movement of residual-fuel 
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oil cannot be rpredicted because of volatile global market conditions, 
OUC argued that long-term trends are an invaluable instrument for 
analyzing oil prices. "Price increases have followed fairly 
constant historical long-term trends. During certain years, for 
example 1973, the prices have taken a step increase then resumed 
the normal trend of increases" (OUC, 1981, p. Bl.3). 
In the case of coal, price projections for a 20-year period 
were based on "current expected delivered costs with free-on-board 
(FOB) mine and transportation costs escalated separately." 
According to the latest published delivered-coal cost for the 
state of Florida, the average cost for November 1980 was $1.80 
per MBtu. Delivered-coal costs are the sum of the FOB mine 
price for the coal, plus the transportation costs, assumed to be 
35 percent of the delivered-coal costs. This assumption, OUC 
claims, is based on current coal and transportation costs from 
the Illinois basin and Southern Appalachian Region . (OUC, 1981, p. 82.2). · 
Contending that coal prices are not as volatile as those of 
oil, and that future coal prices should follow projected trends, 
OUC is confident that the switch from oil to coal will be a sound 
economic decision from which the utility and its customers will 
benefit--a hope shared by the FPSC. For according to an Orlando 
Sentinel article, 11 The only reason state officials are letting 
the Orlando Utilities Commission build a coal-fired power plant 
is the be 1 i ef that coa 1 wil 1 remain cheaper than oil 11 · ( Nesbitt, 
Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983, p. A14). 
Economic rbenefits aside, OUC contends there was still another 
good reason the Stanton Energy Center was needed--fuel independence. 
11 The 1970s, 11 OUC states, 11 taught us a costly lesson. We were energy 
hostages then because of our reliance on imported oil (OUC 
Bulletin, 1984, p. 5). 
The OPEC oil embargoes to which OUC alludes, sent oil prices 
sharply upwards in 1973--the cost per barrel of residual-fuel 
oil increased to over 10 times its per-barrel price prior to the 
Arab-dominated embargoes. With the still troubled situation in 
the Middle East, it is only wise to reduce dependency on that 
region as a source of fuel, OUC argues. The coal-fired Stanton 
Energy Center, utility officials contend, was the most cost-
effective way to ensure a steady supply of power. 
Furthermore, OUC claims that the elimination of the 
estimated 3,750,000 barrels of oil annually will not only 
reduce OUC's dependency on foreign oil by 21 percent, but will 
also 11 aid Florida's efforts to achieve the statewide 50 percent 
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oil reduction by 1990, 11 as established by the federal government 
(OUCs advertisement, (The Orlando Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p. A9). 
To strengthen its 11 reliability 11 and 11 independence 11 
arguments, OUC also stresses that coal mined in America is a 
more reliable source of power than foreign oil. OUC will purchase 
11 high-grade 11 coal at $76 a ton from Kentucky when Stanton begins 
operation. The coal will be delivered to the plant in unit 
trains, two o~ three times a week. Over one million tons of 
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coal is expected to be needed annually. Tom Washburn, an OUC 
planner, states that transportation cost represents 30 percent--
almost $23--of the $76 the utility will pay for a ton of coal 
(Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 1983, p. Al4). 
Legal Procedures, Management and Financing 
Having established the need for the Stanton Energy Center and 
having crossed the FPSC certification hurdle, the OUC moved on to 
arguing its case before other federal, state and local agencies, 
responsible for reviewing and or approving the certi·fication 
application, or other documentation for the plant. In all, 16 
agencies, including the Florida Department of Environmental 
Regulation (DER), the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the 
Power Plant Siting Board, were involved. Basically, through a 
series of public meetings, these agencies were charged with two 
major responsibilities: (i) to determine if the proposed site 
for the plant complied to existing land-use plans and zoning 
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ordinances, and (ii) to determine if the new plant would cause any 
environmental hazards. All 16 agencies ruled in favor of the 
plant on both areas of concern. 
The operation safeguards of the plant are "technically 
sufficient for the protection and welfare of the citizens of 
Florida," the DER concluded (OUC BUlletin, 1984, p. 9). 
Similarly, Joseph W. Landers, former executive director 
of the DER states that: 
~ 
Because the Stanton Energy Center will be a new source, 
it must meet pollution control requirements much more 
stringent than existing sources. It has been clearly 
demonstrated throughout the entire regulatory process 
that the plant will, in fact, meet these very strict 
requirements. The plant will utilize sewage effluent 
for cooling water--a definite plus for the Central 
Florida area with its waste water disposal problems. 
From an environmental standpoint, this plant is clean, 
absolutely clean (OUC advertisement, The Orlando Sentinel, 
August 28, 1984, p. A9). 
In addition to the favorable evaluations of government agencies 
and officials, data from other independent researchers and utility 
plants have reinforced OUC's argument that the coal-fired facility 
will be environmentally safe. One such independent view claims 
that "No one can show any effects on the soils from acid rain. 
One application of fertilizers will have more effect on soil 
acidity than a year of acid rain (OUC advertisement, The Orlando 
Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p A9). 
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But neither these independent findings nor the DER's report--
based on the recommendations of the 15 other agencies--marked the 
end of the mandatory legal steps the OUC had to take prior to con-
struction of its coal-fired plant. In March 1982, more public 
hearings wer~ conducted, after which a certification officer studied 
the application for an additional eight months, OUC records show. 
On November 12, 1982, the hearing officer handed down his 
findings: 
A balance is struck between the need for the 
facility and the environmental impact resulting from 
its construction and operation ..• the coal-fired 
electrical plant is capable of providing abundant 
low cost electrical energy and will produce minimal 
adverse effects on the environment (OUC advertisement, 
The Orlando Sentinel, August 28, 1984, p. A9). 
Following this report, Governor Bob Graham and the Cabinet 
voted unanimously on December 14, 1982 to approve the application 
of the Stanton Energy Center. About a year later, October 1983, 
OUC began construction of its electrical power facility, the 
largest and perhaps the most modern in the state of Florida. 
The new power plant was to be equipped with approximately 
$100 million worth of state-of-the-art environmental protection 
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systems, and is therefore expected to be cleaner than older, oil-
fired plants in the state (OUC,' 1984, Information Bulletin, p. 3). 
Included in these systems are: 
a 10-storey electrostatic precipitator, designed 
to remove fly ash, soot. and other particulate matter 
from combustion gases before they are released in the 
air; 
a 12-s~orey wet limestone scrubber designed to remove 
sulphur dioxide from the combustion .gases ~ hrough a 
chemical process; 
a 43-storey cooling tower designed to use waste 
water for coo 1 i·ng; 
a 55-storey chimney; 
a 569,000-horsepower turbine generator; 
a 23-storey boiler building; and 
a 93-acre pond to hold make-up water for cooling 
water (OUC, 1984, Information Bulletin, p. 3). 
Of the 415 megawatts of power generated by these additional 
facilities, OUC will own 333.5 megawatts, 100 of which Florida 
Power and Light (FPL) has contracted to buy for 15 years. The 
remaining 81.5 megawatts have been contracted for purchase by 
the cities of Kissimmee, Vero Beach, Fort Pierce, Lake Worth, 
Homestead and Starke (OUC, 1984, OUC Today, p. 1). 
Under the management of Black and Veatch Engineers, 
construction of the Stanton Center has been proceeding as originally 
planned, an OUC spokesman states. According to Smith, a 
controversy sparked by critics of the plant did slow down 
the certification and approval process, but did not induce any 
change in architectural design, management procedures, or 
financing. "Fighting an opposition was a diversion, but as far 
as our plans are concerned nothing has changed," Smith states 
(Smith, personal communication, January 23, 1985). 
A recent~ progress report indicated that a total of 66 
contractors and subcontractors have been engaged during the 
first year of construction. Of these contractors, 46 are from 
central Florida, and 14 are from out of state. Also, by 
October 1984, 554 workers had been employed on the site, on-site 
employment is expected to peak at 1,100 by mid-~985 (OUC Progress 
Review, 1984, p. 2). 
To finance the ongoing activities at the Stanton Center, OUC 
sold $250 million in bonds and borrowed $280 million, for a total 
of $530 million--the original estimated cost of the plant (OUC 
Today, 1984, p. 2). M. G. Lewis and Co. of Winter Park, OUC's 
financial advisors, took responsibility for marketing the bonds. 
About 75 bankers were chosen to sell the bonds (Nesbitt, Simmons, 
The Orlando Sentinel, 1984, November 15, pp. Al, A6). 
Commenting on the success of this venture, OUC officials 
state that they were able to sell their bonds quickly, and at a 
lower interest rate than others because of their "high credit" 
rating (OUC Today, 1984, p. 2). 
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The $280 million loan, OUC sources indicate, was negotiated 
with Morgan Trust Company of New York, and was the largest 
commitment Morgan had ever made to a municipal utility. Also 
participating in the transaction were Sun Bank NA and Barnett 
Banks, each of which contributed $25 million. OUC estimates 
the average interest on the $280 million at 9 percent (OUC, 1984, 
OUC Today, p. 2). 
The utiJity claims that its ability to raise the money needed 
for the Stanton Center as easily as it did as "a significant 
accomplishment and is evidence of the financial stability and 
history of sound management that characterizes OUC (OUC, 1984, 
OUC Today, p. 2). 
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In addition to being proud of its fund-raising abilities, OUC . 
also reports that the total estimated cost of the plant now stands 
at $511 million--down $19 million from the $530 million originally 
estimated in January, 1980. Table 4 illustrates the changing cost 
estimates from 1980 through 1984. OUC attributes the reduced costs 
to factors such as: lower inflation, "soft market" conditions in the 
power plant construction and equipment supply industries; the OUC's 
"unique wage-stabilization agreement--fixing salaries for the 4-year 
construction period--and optimal design of facility (OUC, 1984, 
Progress Review, p. 1). 
With the wage stabilization agreement, there is only a small 
chance of cost overruns, OUC contends. "The only thing that could 
cause the dramatic kinds of cost overruns that the public might 
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TABLE 4 
COST-ESTIMATE HISTORY OF THE STANTON ENERGY CENTER 
Total Project Projected Commercial Source of 
Date Cost Estimate Operation Date Estimate 
Jan. 1980 566,102,000 March 1986 Site Selection 
Study 
Sept. 1980 535,058,000 Nov. 1986 Official Cost 
;- Estimate 
May 1981 546,471,000 Nov. 1986 Need Hearing 
Sept. 1982 550,925,000 Late 1986 Summary of Need 
and Costs 
Spring 1983 556,368,000 Sept. 1987 B&V Economic 
Evaluation 
Nov. 1983 530,216,000 Sept. 1987 Official Cost 
Estimate 
August 1984 511,069,000 July 1987 Official Cost 
Estimate 
Source: Prepared for OUC by Black and Veatch 
fear would be delaying construction of this plant (OUC, 1984, 
Progress Review, p. 3). 
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Apart from reporting that the cost of the Stanton Energy Center 
is down 10 percent, OUC states that the project is ahead of schedule. 
According to Progress Review, the current schedule calls for the plant 
to be in operation by July 1987, instead of September as previously 
planned. 11 This acceleration in schedule is especially significant 
since, for each month that this plant comes in early during this 
period of the year, fuel cost savings can reach $6 million ... 
because of the cost differential between coal and oil, 11 OUC claims 
(OUC, 1984, Progress Review, p. 1). 
In essence, OUC's justification for building its power plant 
at this particular time revolves around savings and reliability. As 
discussed in this chapter, company officials contend that if Stanton 
Energy Center Unit I were not constructed by 1992, when the OUC 
system will require additional capacity, the system's reliability 
as a source of electricity will be significantly reduced. In 
addition, the delay of the center past its earliest possible 
commercial operation date will result in higher energy prices for 
OUC customers, OUC argues. According to company estimates, the 
comparative annual costs would be 5.7 percent higher in 1987, and 
as much as 21.1 percent higher in 1991 if Stanton were delayed. 
In other words, the plant would cost consumers an additional $84.7 
million over its 30-year lifespan (OUC, 1984, Progress Review, p 1). 
Finally, not constructing the coal-fired plant at the 
earliest possible date would result in the consumption of an 
additional 8,000,000 barrels of oil between 1987 and 1991, OUC 
contends. 
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But while OUC continues to produce these impressive statistics, 
simultaneously forging ahead with construction of the plant, 
there are those who have advanced equally convincing arguments, 
challenging the validity of the commission's claims. 
Subsequently, a conflict, reaching rancorous proportions, 
has evolved Qetween the OUC and several community interest 
groups. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CASE AGAINST THE COAL-FIRED PLANT AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE 
Not long after the announcement of the proposed new OUC plant 
was made public, opposition surfaced within the community. 
Residents, acting individually and in groups, argued that the 
power plant, named for retired OUC president, Curtis H. Stanton, 
would not only be an unnecessary economic burden for OUC 
customers, but would also pose a serious threat to the environment. 
Emissions from the new plant would pollute the air, the 
opposition environmentalists contend. Additionally, opponents 
of the power facility claimed that t~e plant was not needed 
because OUC already had more electric power than it needed to 
serve its customers. 
In addition to questioning the economic need for the Stanton 
Energy Center, critics also deplored what they cons.idered OUC's 
arbitrary decision to impose upon the community a major potential 
polluter without public debate. Critics argued that the people 
in the community should have had a say in determining the need 
for the power plant. 
These concerns formed the basis of a major controversy 
between OUC and its opponents, and also set the stage for 
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subsequent legal battles which brought the Orlando Utilities 
Commission face to face with its adversaries in several public 
forums, including the state's highest court. 
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William Hall, an Orlando resident, began a string of legal 
actions brought against OUC. In October 1982, Hall filed a suit 
in an Orange County Court, challenging the utility's right to 
offer revenue bonds to help finance the power plant. Hall, who 
had considered buying OUC bonds, said he became concerned when he 
could not find any specific authority in the utility's charter to issue 
bonds (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 5, 1984, pp. Al, AB). 
Not only did this discovery deter him from purchasing the 
bonds, but it also prompted him to ask the court to revoke the 
decision by the Orange County Circuit Court and the city of 
Orlando, granting the OUC permission to issue $700 million in 
bonds to help cover the cost of the Stanton plant. 
Until May 1984, OUC had issued only $250 million worth of 
bonds. OUC board members decided to get a short-term loan 
rather than issue bonds for the total cost of constructing the 
Stanton plant, because the utility would have had to pay too high 
an interest rate. Board member Grace Lindblom, who helped 
negotiate the bond sale, claims that ·court challenges by 
opponents of the plant prevented OUC from getting to the market 
earlier (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 26, 1984, pp. Bl, B5). 
In his suit, Hall, a retired Air Force officer who is an 
active participant in City Hall politics, charged that the special 
1929 charter creating OUC did not give it the authority to issue 
bonds. Contrary to Hall's claim, Judge Lon Cornelius stated that 
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the utility's decision to issue tax-free revenue bonds was quite 
legitimate. The plaintiff's case was subsequently dismissed (Simmons, 
The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, pp. Bl, B6). 
But the judge's ruling generated criticism not only from Hall, 
but also from other plant opponents, who charged that the court 
"sidestepped the issue of whether OUC's charter gives it the authority 
to sell bonds," and instead considered only the time the complaint was 
filed (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, p. B-1). 
Hall filed his suit four months after the bond validation 
hearing--two months after the appear period expired. The 
plaintiff maintained that"! don't believe OUC had the right to 
-
issue bonds then, and I don't believe it does now" (Ibid). 
The bond-issue ruling was only the foretaste of several legal 
victories the OUC would be handed by local courts and other 
government agencies. It was only about a month after the Hall 
ruling that the hearing officer of the Florida Department of 
Environmental Regulation recommended that Governor Graham and 
the Cabinet approve the Stanton Energy Center. 
At this juncture, opposition to the plant heightened. 
Orlando resident John Hedrick and about 25 other people--
mostly retirees from the College Park area--met informally to 
plan a campaign strategy against the OUC power plant. The new 
group, calling itself "The Committee to Stop the Coal Plant," 
agreed on a membership fee of $10 and also on an open-door 
membership policy. 
Having defined its major goal as "forcing" the Orlando City 
Council to put the question of OUC building the coal-fired plant 
before voters in a special election, the newly-formed organization 
set out to seek the 8,400 signatures--15 percent--of registered 
voters needed under city law to force the proposed action. 
Accordin~ to city charter, if enough voters sign petitions 
endorsing an ordinarice, the city council must approve it within 
two weeks or let voters consider it in a special election within 
30 days. 
After three months of door-to-door campaign, "The Committee 
to Stop the Coal Plant," which had changed its name to P.O.W.E.R. 
Now (People of Orlando/Orange County Working to Effect Reform 
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Now) collected more than 12,000 signatures from Orlando residents, 
calling for ,a referendum on the Stanton plant P.O.W.E.R. Now presented 
the signatures to the Orlando City Council, but was told by city com-
missioners that "The city of Orlando cannot interfere in the affairs 
of the OUC." Although OUC is owned by the city, it operates autono-
mously (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24, 1984, p. Bl). 
"The council has clearly violated the city charter by not 
acting on the petition, 11 said P.O.W.E.R. Now founder John Hedrick 
(Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24, 1984, p. Bl). 
In essence, the proposed referendum questioned the city of 
Orlando's participation in the building of the Stanton Energy 
Center. P.O.W.E.R. Now contended that the OUC could not legally 
construct its new plant without voter approval, since the city 
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is the co-owner of the 3,280-property on which the power facility 
is being built. 
· According to Mary Cornell, P.O.W.E.R. Now's president, her 
organization's action was prompted by the environmental and 
economic concerns mentioned earlier in this chapter, and also 
by the group's conviction that OUC needed to be more accountable to its 
customers (M. Cornell, personal communication, January 17, 1985). 
The city commission's failure to respond favorably to the 
petition did not dampen the spirits of the OUC critics. 
P.O.W.E.R. Now, in collaboration with the Central Florida Young 
Republicans, filed a lawsuit in the Orange County Circuit Court to 
force the city of Orlando to call a referendum on the Stanton 
Energy Center. 
The 550-member Young Republicans group offered to join 
forces with P.O.W.E.R. Now to fight for a referendum on the plant, 
because it "felt very strongly that the matter should go before the 
Orlando voters (D. Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985). 
Group chairman Doug Guetzlo says that long before his 
organization entered the legal battle against OUC, the leadership 
of the Young Republicans had been "very concerned" about the impact 
the new coal-fired plant would have on the environment. Therefore, 
11 we decided to do what we could to get the issue on the ballot" 
(Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985). 
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Guetzlo, who says he was not sure his organization would have 
initiated the suit against OUC had P.O.W.E.R. Now not done so, also 
stated that the joint venture was 11 simply a matter of economics. 11 
With both groups teaming up, the legal cost incurred by each was 
considerably lower than going it alone would have been. In total, 
the combined legal cost to organizations was $1,200, most of which 
was spent on reproducing legal documents and for paying minor court 
costs. The free legal counsel offered by local attorneys contributed 
significantly to the opposition's low legal expenditures (Guetzlo, 
personal communication, March 6, 1985). 
The collaboration between the two groups, however, was short-
lived. Once the Circuit Court judge ruled against a referendum, 
11 we quit, our point had been made. let the people decide. When 
that happened, we felt our mission was fulfilled, 11 Guetzlo states. 
He explains from then on, the Young Republicans, a local arm of the 
national party organization, "diverted our attention to partisan 
efforts (Guetzlo, personal communication, March 6, 1985). 
In ruling on the proposed referendum, Orange County Circuit 
Judge Joe Baker stated that residents "have no authority to block 
or influence" construction of the power p 1 ant through a referendum. 11 
Besides, Baker says that "The proposed referendum cannot have any 
force or effect under any legal theory. The legislature has 
created Orlando Utilities Commission independent of city government, 
with the full, absolute and final right to decide on questions like 
this (Spirduso, The Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1984, p. Cl). 
But P.O.W.E.R. Now spokesman Roger Gaines describes Baker's 
ruling as "bizarre" and 11 off the wall." Gaines and his 
colleagues argue that Baker did not address the question of 
citizen's right to a referendum on the power plant. Most of the 
judge's 36-page opinion was a history of the nation's energy and 
electrical use, the debate on coal-versus-oil power, and an 
explanation of energy-related topics, critics contend. 11 ! was 
;-
shocked with the opinion, Gaines says, "It's an essay on the 
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history of electricity and energy that any eighth-grader can learn. 
The question was do we have the right to a referendum? Somewhere 
in his ruling he totally lost the argument in this case 1' (McKee, The 
Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1983, p. C4). 
On the contrary side, OUC attorney Thomas Tart contends that 
Baker "tried to paint a whole picture. These people (OUC critics) 
have not won the first battle against us. They're just trying to 
de 1 ay the process. The judge is trying to examine. everything in the 
case. Those people who are complaining are ignorant of the issue of 
power in the state. They've probably never been in a power plant" 
(McKee, The Orlando Sentinel, October 6, 1983, p. C4). 
Despite Judge Baker's ruling, P.O.W.E.R. Now and other 
opponents of the Stanton plant persisted in ~heir fight to halt 
construction of the project. Acting on the advice of their 
attorneys, P.O.W.E.R. Now took its request for a referendum on 
the power plant to the 5th District Court of Appeal in Daytona 
Beach. In the appeal, the plaintiff asked the court to expedite 
the case or prevent OUC from awarding any more contracts until the 
matter was settled in court. The request for a freeze of all 
contracts was denied. 
While P.O.W.E.R. Now awaited the 5th District Court of 
Appeal 1 s decision on the referendum, the Sierra Club was busy 
also filing a suit against OUC, asking that certification need 
for the Stanton Energy Center be reopened. 
The Sierra Club, an environmental advocacy group, opposed 
the power plant for the same reasons P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Young 
Republicans had given as justification for their fight. According 
to Sierra Club attorney Irby Pugh, 11 We wanted to show that the 
impact should be weighed with the degree of need. If there is no 
need, there should be no impact. But it (the plant) is going to 
have a major environmental impact. 11 Claiming, therefore, that it 
missed the only preliminary public hearing at which voters could 
have participated in certification proceedings, the Sierra Club 
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in its suit, asked that the PSC, which approved the plant in 1981, 
reopen certification hearings (Pugh, personal communication, October 
12, 1984). 
While Pugh and his group voiced their complaints, Hall once more 
entered the fray, this time appealing his case in the Florida Supreme 
Court, but again he lost to OUC. Hall was ·ordered to reimburse the 
utility $1,149.60 to cover the cost of copying legal documents. 
Like P.O.W.E.R. now and the Young Republicans, the Sierra 
Club also questioned the right of the OUC to exclude the vast 
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majority of its customers from participating in the deliberations 
determining the fate of the coal-fired plant. In its separately 
filed suit, the Sierra Club contended that it had not been given 
the opportunity to argue before government officials the need for 
the Stanton power plant (Pugh, personal communication, October 12, 
1984). 
According to Sierra Club attorney, Pugh, the organization, 
which has nattonwide connections, first began opposing the OUC plant 
on environmental grounds in 1982 at the promptings of Sierra Club 
member Barney Capehart, a University of Florida professor of 
economics. Capehart and his colleagues contend that the power plant 
was not needed. The Sierra Club responded to his argument and 
wanted to appear before the state hearing officer and the Florida 
Electrical Power Plant Siting Board, made up of the Governor and 
Cabinet, to pursue the matter. They were refused a hearing on the 
basis that the Florida State Constitution permits only the PSC to 
certify need for a power plant. Consequently, the Sierra Club, 
which had not attended the preliminary PSC hearing on the issue, was 
denied a chance to express its view to the hearing officer or the 
siting board. Pugh and his organization admitted that their 
failure to appear at the preliminary hearing was "a big mistake." 
According to OUC and state law, opponents of the plant "have control 
through public hearings on the issue and not at the polls" (Simmons, 
The Orlando Sentinel, August 19, 1983, p. Bl). By missing the hearing, 
the Sierra Club forfeited its right to a public voice. 
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In handing down its judgment on the Sierra Club's suit, the 
5th District Court of Appeal stated that the fact that plant 
critics did not argue their case before the agencies certifying the 
Stanton Power Center was no basis to prevent the OUC from proceeding 
with the project as planned. The court, according to The Orlando 
Sentinel, agreed with a motion filed by OUC, which argued that Pugh's 
request for a rehearing should be denied because it did not raise 
any new point~ and was not filed in time. 
Rules of legal procedure require motions for rehearing to be 
filed within 15 days of the original ruling, and to raise issues 
not addressed during the initial appeal. Tart, who argued in defense 
of OUC, said Pugh "re-argued the same old story, 11 filing his motion 
afterl9 days (Simmons,_The Orlando Sentinel,August 19, 1983,pp. Cl,Cll). 
After its last-ditch attempt to stop construction of the 
Stanton power plant failed, the Sierra Club contemplated taking its 
case to the Florida Supreme Court. Upon reconsideration, however, 
the organization decided to concede defeat. Waging the fight all 
the way to the Supreme Court "is so expensive, 11 Pugh states "I 
think its up to the community now to take up the fight" (Pugh 
personal communication, October 12, 1984). 
Despite obvious disillusionment over the outcome of the court 
suit, and the lack of widespread public support outside of the 
few organizations mentioned, Pugh, along with P.O.W.E.R. Now, 
joined forces to agitate for legislation to restructure OUC. 
64 
In January 1984, P.O.W.E.R. Now proposed to the Orange County 
Legislative Delegation that the charter of OUC be changed "to make 
it more accountable" to the Orlando City Council. To this end, the 
organizations suggested that the commission board members be 
elected rather than appointed. Currently, the OUC board nominates 
board members for the city-owned utility and the Orlando City 
Council can confirm or reject the nominations. 
In the past 32 years, the city council has rejected none of 
OUC's nominees for board membership (G. Chewning, personal communi-
cation, March 17, 1985). In addition to Mayor Frederick, the current 
board is composed of Orange County educator, Royce B. Walden, business-
woman, Grace Lindblom, board president, Wally M. Sanderlin, and vice 
president, James H. Pugh Jr. 
Apart from proposing an elected board, OUC critics also 
called for other changes. These included disclosure of the 
utility's finances, a requirement that OUC could hold public 
hearings on projects costing more than $100 million, and that the 
city council have more authority over the utility's policy. 
P.0.W.E.R Now urged that the changes be adopted to give residents 
more control over the OUC (The Orlando Sentinel, January 1984, pp. 
Bl, 86). The decisions made by OUC officers affect all Orlando 
residents as much as the decisions that you .made,'.' P.O.W.E.R. Now 
spokesman, Roger Gaines told lawmakers. "Yet Orlando residents have 
no say in how the utility is run 11 (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, 
January 17, 1984, p. 86). 
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Gaines argues that the city of Orlando 11 ignored 11 the 
petition signed by more than 12,000 residents that sought a public 
vote on whether OUC should build the $546 million coal-fired plant . 
The city justified its action by claiming that it had no jurisaiction 
over the 0 UC ( Ga i n es , person a 1 c ommu n i cat i on , January 15 , 19 8 5 ) . 
The proposed changes to the OUC charter would make the utility 
commission "more responsive" to its ratepayers, Pugh contends. 
According to ~im, board members under the present system are not 
representative of the Orlando community, because they are 11 selected 
from a small group of the city's financial elite. Citizens have 
no input in utility decisions" (Spirduso, The Orlando Sentinel, 
October 20, 1983, p. C-11). 
Despite arguments, the 10 member bipartisan Orange County 
legislative delegation unanimously rejected the opponents' 
proposed amendments to the OUC charter. Prior to reaching its 
verdict, the delegation was warned by Senator George Stuart that 
it was "meddling" in something they knew little about. "We're the 
wrong people to amend the OUC charter, 11 Stuart says, "We don't have 
have the staff to study the issues ... and no experience in the 
utility business 11 (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, January 17, 1984, 
pp. B-1, B-6). OUC officials argued that any change in its charter, 
particularly a provision for an elected board, would 11 hurt 11 its 
financial rating and increase the price of money it needs to borrow to 
pay for construction of the plant. 11 It would cost us over $60 million 
for the Stanton plant alone if our credit rating went from AA to 
A'' OUC board president Wally Sanderlin said (Simmons, The Orlando 
Sentinel, January 17, 1985, p. B-6). 
66 
But P.O.W.E.R. Now attorney Marcia Ramsdell, who drafted the 
20-page amendment proposal, disputed OUC's claim. According to 
Ramsdell, the amendment protected investors by guaranteeing that 
utility rates would remain high enough to cover its debts. It also 
protected the community by providing the public with more and better 
information about its operations. Ramsdell concluded that most of 
the opposition from OUC stemmed from its "refusal to give up some of 
the power it had gained during its 60 year existence" (Simmons, The 
Orlando Sentinel, January 17, 1984, pp. B-1, B-6). 
In addition to challenging the present OUC charter, plant 
critics have also objected to a federal air permit for the Stanton 
plant. In a letter written in late 1983, Pugh told the regional 
officials of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that 
OUC would not meet a DEcember 10 deadline for starting construction 
on the Stanton Energy POwer Center, and asked the EPA to terminate 
the air permit. But according to OUC general manager Harry Luff, 
construction on the plant began in October 1983, with site clearing 
and testing for the facility's foundation. However, Pugh claims that 
''They have not started building the plant; ·site-clearing work is not 
construction" (Giesen, The Orlando Sentinel, November 24, 1983, pp. 
D-1, D-10) coal-fired power plant in June 1982, after certifying that 
plant emissions would not exceed state and federal air quality limits. 
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Opposition to the OUC new power plant was not limited only 
to the forementioned groups. Based on figures presented by the 
Sierra Club, other plant critics have concluded that Central 
Florida's lakes and streams will become "virtually sterile" from 
the pollutants, and that the polluted air and acid rain will cause 
lung disease (The Orlando Sentinel, October 18, 1983, pp. C-1, C-5). 
Furthermore, some environmentalists have expressed concern 
about the imp~ct of coal dust blowing from trains transporting the 
coal to the plant. The cities of Maitland, Altamonte Springs, 
Longwood, Deland, Sanford and the Council of Local Government of 
Seminole County all raised objections to the construction of the 
power plant. The cities greatest fear was the heavy coal-dust 
residue and major traffic jams, coal trains passing through the 
communities would case (Abrahams, The Little Sentinel, November 26, 
1982, pp. B-1, B-9). 
The line through Maitland is one of the three routes from Jack-
sonville that will transport coal to the Stanton power plant. The 
other two routes would be via Lakeland and Auburndale. 
In addition to the challenges from the various municipalities, 
OUC faced protests from local homeowners. In February 1984, the Isle 
of Pines Homeowners Association complained that OUC's railroad crossing 
at Narcoosee and Moss Park Roads woud cut across the only entrance to 
the 200-home subdivision in Southeast Orange County (The Orlando Se~ti­
nel, February 24, 1984, pp. B-1, B-7). In voicing their objection 
to the railroad line, the homeowners contended that trains would 
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"threaten their safety." If there were a derailment, an accident 
or breakdown, we would be completely stranded, 11 says Bill Kirk, 
president of the homeowner's association. But apparently the 
homeowners expressed concerns did not alter anything, as OUC 
proceeded with the ra i 1 road route as planned. Kirk admits he 
knew the railroad track had been approved for construction near 
the subdivision in which he lives, but says he had no idea how 
the tracks would be laid. 11 I thought we would have time to have 
some input on where the tracks were laid, but they're working so 
fast that they'll have it done before we can telephone the right 
office," Kirk states (The Orlando Sentinel, February 24, 1984, p. B-7). 
Also expressing concern about the effects of the OUC new 
plant on the environment was the Orange County Chapter of the 
Florida Audubon Society. In a letter dated July 15, 1982, the 
organization explained that it could not endorse the construction 
of the Stanton Energy Center without reservation, but it would 
not take an 11 active stand against it since, the process of 
approval and permitting through the Public Service Commission 
and administrative hearings is nearly complete (M.H. Keim, 
personal communication, July 15, 1982). 
Additionally, 11 0range County Audubon Society is convinced 
that the first priority of any new power plant should be to 
reduce the use of oil. In this respect only do we support this 
new coal-fired power plant" (M.H. Keim, personal communication, 
July 15, 1982). In what might be considered an apt summary of 
the arguments underscoring the perceived environmental threats 
of the Stanton Energy Center, University of Florida economist 
Capehart stated that 11 The need for-the coal-fired power plant 
is very small compared to the environmental damage (Abrahams, The 
Orlando Sentinel, December 2, 1982, p. C-1). Table 5 outlines 
potential sources of pollution resulting from the OUC coal-fired 
plant. 
Conservation--The Alternative to the Stanton Energy Center 
While environmentalists paint this rather grim picture of 
what the Stanton plant would mean for Central Florida's aquatic 
and wildlife ecosystems, other critics of the plant concerned 
themselves with a related and equally important question--
c o·n s e rv at i on . 
The economically far-reaching oil embargoes of the 1970s 
prompted state officials to pass legislation--the 1980 Florida 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act--designed to make Florida*s 
57 electric utilities less dependent on oil as a source of fuel. 
To this end, consumers statewide have been encouraged to reduce 
their cons~mption of energy. 
But critics contend that, in encouraging utilities to switch 
from oil to coal-fired power plants, the state has undermined its 
conservation goals. Nine coal-fired plants, including the Stanton 
Energy Cente·r, have been approved s i nee the beg.inning of the 1980s. 
Once they go bu i 1 d, build, burn, burn, they can , t go conservation, 11 
Sierra Club spokesman Pug,h states. "The goals are mutually 
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through energy sales and they can't do that by asking their 
customers to conserve 11 (Pugh, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 
1983, p. A-6). 
Pugh further contends that an aggressive conservation program 
by OUC would have been much more economical than building the new 
plant. 
In support of this view, Orlando resident J. R. Mccaffrey 
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argues that: 'In focusing on the question of reliable energy, "you've 
(The Orlando Sentinel) missed a key point in the economic argument 
against building this plant at this time. That is, undertaking the 
huge cost of building the plant before we've obtained the maximum 
benefits possible from conservation will work strongly against an 
effective conservation program 11 (McCaffrey, The Orlando Sentinel, 
November 29, 1982, p. 9). 
Similarly, Citizens for Conservation has charged that the 11 0UC 
has failed to fully consider energy-conservation programs as an 
alternative to th 415 megawatt plant" (Gworek, personal communication, 
March 1, 1985). And the Audubon Society states that it is "convinced 
that the best method of reducing oil consumption is through the con-
servation of energy. While we acknowledge that OUC has established 
a program of conservation, we urge you to pursue this program even 
more aggressively" (Keim, personal communication, July 15, 1982). 
To support this pro-cons~rvationargument, Pugh points to the 
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) as an ideal example of how 
conservation programs can be. Instead of constructing a 
proposed 640-megawatt coal-fired plant, FPC has resorted to 
conservation which has saved the company and its customers 
millions of dollars, Pugh states. 
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An FPC spokesman has disclosed that one of the company's 
conservation programs--load management--has saved FPC more than 
$64 million in generating costs. Load management aimed at 
controlling some of the biggest energy consumers, such as air 
conditioners, ~lectric heaters, pool pumps and water heaters. 
Radio technology is used to turn off these electrical appliances 
during times of peak energy use. As compensation for signing up 
for the load management program, customers get credit ranging from 
$14 to $18 on their uti-lity bills (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando 
Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6). 
Why, then did OUC not emulate FPC by promoting 11 aggressive 11 
conservation, but instead opted for building the Stanton Power Center? 
According to OUC planner Don Moore, his company did not 
consider conservation as an alternative to building the coal-fired 
plant because conservation technology was still considered 
11 experimental 11 when plans for the plant were made in 1978. "Now 
OUC is too far along in building the coal plant to 'launch an 
active program• of conservation," Moore states (Nesbitt, Simmons, 
The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6). 
OUC's conservation efforts have been limited to energy audits, 
customer-awareness programs, and giving each customer a $10 credit 
for buying energy-efficient appliances (Nesbitt, Simmons, The 
Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6). 
But OUC critics argue that installing a load-management 
program similar to FPC's could delay the need for the Stanton 
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plant until the early 2000s. Capehart, who has written numerous 
reports on energy management for state and federal officials, 
contends that OUC could use a load-management program to meet its 
energy needs until the 1990s at a cost almost $100 million less 
than construction of additional generating capacity. 
Citing studies performed for the Governor's Energy Office and 
for the PSC, the Sierra Club claims that savings of 50 percent on 
residential consumption are achievable using existing products, 
appliances and technology. "OUC could embark on an aggressive 
plan to encourage all of their customers to switch to high-
efficiency appliances and devices when their old ones wear out, 11 
states Jack Blackburn (Blackburn, personal communication, January 
15, 1985). 
According to Blackburn, appliances such as gas water heaters, 
high-efficiency refrigerators, and high-efficiency air conditioners 
could save from 30 to 100 percent on energy use. These potential 
savings for the residential sector have been outlined in Table 6. 
The Rekindling of the Legal Struggle 
Up untn early 1984., none of the indiv.iduals, community groups, 
or organizations opposing the Stanton Energy Center has scored a 
single victory over the OUC. Not even the pro-conservationists 
with their attractive energy-saving proposal could dissuade the 
TABLE 6 
POTENTIAL SAVINGS ON ELECTRICITY BY USING ENERGY-EFFICIENT 
APPLIANCES AND DEVICES IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTOR 
Gas-Water Heaters 
Saves 100 percent of electric use 248.3 GWH 
Gas Space Heaters 
Saves 100 ~ercent of electric use 106.7 GWH 
High-Efficiency Refrigerators 
Saves over 50 percent of electric use 80.8 GWH 
High-Efficienty Air Conditioners 
Saves about 30 percent of electric use 42.6 GWH 
478.4 GWH 
At a 60 percent load factor and a 20 percent reserve margin, this 
is equal to 109 MW of capacity. 
Other Amounts of Savings Can be Obtained by Using: 
Heat-Pump Space Heaters 
Heat-Pump Water Heaters 
Solar Water Heaters 
Heat Recovery Water Heaters 







utility from building its multi-million dollar power plant. In 
May 1984, however, an event which still did not alter construction 
plans, at least sent OUC running to the public, via the media, to 
solicit support for the plant. 
Seven months after P.O.W.E.R. Now appealed its case on the 
referendum, the 5th District Court of Appeal ruled that Orlando 
must let city residents vote on the city's participation in the 
project. The court stressed, however, that because of OUC's 
r 
autonomy, the city and residents could not stop the utility from 
building the power plant (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, May 24, 
1984, p. B-1). 
Having scored their first victory in the appeal court, 
opponents of the Stanton Energy Center returned to the Orange 
County Circuit Court, this time to ask for a temporary injunction 
halting construction on the plant pending the referendum. But the 
request was not granted. The Orlando City Council scheduled the 
referendum for September 4, 1984 after P.O.W.E.R. Now protested 
the council's initial decision to hold the vote in November. 
As the referendum approached, opponents and supporters of the 
power plant stepped up their efforts to lure voters into their 
respective camps. 
The OUC advertising campaign, according. to The Orlando Sentinel, 
cost a total of $175,000. The utility began telling its story 
with an in-house media program about a year prior to the 
referendum. Fliers promoting the coal-fired plant were also 
distributed. However, it was not until the week of August 6, 
1984--approximately three weeks before the referendum--that OUC 
invested most of its energies and money in its media campaign. 
Prompting opponents to characterize the referendum as a "fight 
bet"ween David and Goliath," the OUC poured $33,000 into its 
advertising program (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 6, 
1984, p. A-1). According to Pugh, the utility ran 10 television 
advertisements a day prior to the vote on the plant (Hurvitz, 
Public Relations Business, August 5, 1984, p. 4). 
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In addition to utilizing television to promote the plant, 
OUC also advertised heavily on radio and in newspapers, and 
distributed booklets and brochures. Distribution of the pro-
Stanton literature began at the OUC Orange Avenue headquarters, 
when utility officials arranged to have a booklet discussing the 
need of the plant stuffed into employees' pay envelopes (Simmons, 
The Orlando Sentinel, August 6, 1984, p. C-1), also confirmed in 
interview with OUC officials). 
An announcement on August 29, 1984, that the cost of the 
new plant would be $511 million, $19 million less than 
the previous estimate made in November, 1983. 
Tours of the construction site were conducted two 
weeks before the referendum. 
OUC Today, a twice-yearly tabloid with feature stories 
highlighting OUC activities was sent to customers 
(personal communication with OUC officials and 
supporters--Smith, Ferran--also reported in 
Public Relations Business, 1984, p. 4). 
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"We're going to do everything to make sure everybody knows 
why we proposed the project, and why we have gone ahead with it," 
OUC spokesman Steve Willis states. The primary targets of the 
media campaign, according to OUC advertising consultants, were the 
undecided voters, estimated by these consultants to be over 40 
percent of the city's eligible voters (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, ,.. 
August 6, 1984, p. C-1). 
Funds for the advertising campaign were disbursed after OUC 
officials voted to divert money intended for promotion of 
conservation to publicity, aimed at halting what had been perceived 
as "an erosion of public support for the plant" (personal communi-
cation with OUC officials, also reported in The Orlando Sentinel, 
August 6, 1984, p. C-6). 
The $175,000 spent on promoting the power plant contrasted 
sharply with the ouc•s 1982 advertising budget of $5,000 (Ibid). 
Perhaps the greatest boost for the OUC position came from 
the aggressive publicity campaign undertaken by Energy for 
Tomorrow, a group of business _ people, formed with the expressed 
purpose of "fighting for tbe coal-fired plant. 11 Group chairman 
Harry Ferran, president of the Orlando-based Ferran Engineering 
Group, contends that opponents of the Stanton Energy Center 
relied on "half-truths" in their attempt to incite public 
disapproval of the project (Ferran, personal communication, 
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January 11, 1985). 
Energy for Tomorrow, Ferran explains, had one purpose, and 
that was "to see to it that the people of Orlando voted No," 
therefore supporting their own utility. Besides, the case against 
the plant was so weak, that it was fallacious and we had to do 
something to set the record straight" (Ferran, personal communication, 
January 11, 1985). 
Questioned on his business dealings with OUC, Ferran says 
hi s three e 1 e ctr i ca 1 and pl _um bi n g comp an i es had , i n the pas t , 
done "some work" for the utility but he emphasized that that had 
nothing to do with his involvement in the pro-OUC campaign. 
According to a contract report from OUC consulting firm, 
none of Ferran's companies had a contract with the utility at the 
time the research for this study was being conducted. However, 
several of the members of the 29-member Energy for Tomorrow 
steering committee represented firms that do business--some 
regularly--with OUC. Included with OUC's public relations 
consulting firm, Fry-H~mmond-Bar.r, - Inc., and the Barnett 
banking system, which loaned the utility $25 million to help 
finance the power plant (Energy for Tomorrow "Contribution Report," 
1984, also Black and Veatch Engineering firm, "Contract Report"). 
In a seven-week period, Ferran's group which disbanded after 
the referendum, raised over $100,000 from businesses supporting 
the Stanton plant. Of this amount, 47 percent came from out of 
state companies, the group's contribution reports showed (Energy 
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for Tomorrow Contribution Report, August 1984, pp. 1-5). 
Among the out of state contributors were companies which 
also regularly do business with OUC. Included are the utilities 
consulting engineering firm, Black and Veatch, which contributed 
$4,250 OUC financial consultants, M. G. Lewis and Co., gave $1,000, 
and Lewis' president James Lentz contributed $500. Other 
contributors were Orlando Mayor Bill Frederick who gave $100, 
Merrill Lynch of New York, a broker for OUC bonds gave $1,000, 
~ 
and Westinghouse Electric Corporation of Orlando, who was hired 
to build the $27 million turbine generator for the new plant, 
contributed $1,000 (Energy for Tomorrow contribution report, 
August 1984, pp. 1-5). 
Of the $100,000 raised, $93,000 was paid to supporters for 
staffing a phone bank and for mailing campaign materials and 
bumper stickers to Orlando residents, Ferran explains. In addition 
to phoning voters, distributing stickers and mailing brochures, 
Energy for Tomorrow, aided by its Orlando-based public relations 
agency, Public Relations Unlimited, Inc., also engaged in high-
volume advertising in local media, scheduled press conferences and 
speaking engagements with social and civic organizations, and 
wrote letters to local newspapers (Ferran, personal communication, 
January 11, 1985). 
Table 7 is a breakdown of Energy for Tomorrow's publicity campaign. 
Much of the publicity effort by both the OUC and Energy for 
Tomorrow addressed the charges leveled against the power plant by 
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critics--the need for the plant, the effects on the environment, 
future increases in electricity rates and conservation. One of the 
group's advertisements, perhaps the most detailed and convincing, 
with the endorsement of Orlando Mayor Bill Frederick, best illu-
strates the thrust of the pro-Stanton campaign. 
If the referendum passes, and the Orlando Utilities 
Commission stops construction of the new plant ... we 
will alL-lose. 
Already, over $120 million have been spent, and that 
money didn't come from 11 Uncle Sam. 11 It was borrowed 
from investors, who must be repaid. Repaid to the very 
last cent, even if there is no new plant to help meet these 
long-term financial obligations. 
If the referendum is passed, the potential effect on our 
electric bills and our tax bills is not only obvious, 
but unavoidable. Every single citizen in the City of 
Orlando will lose if we don't finish contruction of the 
new coal-fired electrical plant (Energy for Tomorrow, 
paid political advertisement, The Orlando Sentinel, 
August 28, 1984, p. 3). 
While OUC and its supporters conducted their massive media 
campaign, extolling the virtues of the Stanton plant, opponents 
repeated charges that the power plant is not needed. But regardless 
of how credible opponents views had been, their inability to match 
the spending power of the OUC and its allies minimized the impact 
Table 7 
Energy for Tomorrow's Publicity Campaign 
* Three press conferences: one at OUC's 62 year old 
plant to announce the formation of Energy for 
Tomorrow; one at the construction site to dramatize 
that $110 million had already been spent on the plant, 
and one in the office of the supervisor of elections 
to cla~ify the inverted language of the referendum. 





WCPX-Channel 6 television. 
Four direct mail pieces--every Orlando resident got 
at least one. 
Distribution of door hangers in the minority community, 
listing minority leaders who supported the plant. 
Endorsements_, inc 1 ud i ng one from the Chamber of 
Commerce and one from Mayor Bill Frederick, quoted 
previously. 
Speeches to community groups. 
* A phone bank, in whi'ch every registered voter was 
called four different times with four different 
messages. 
Source: The September 24 edition of Public Relations Business, 
a weekly news service of public relations. 
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they might have otherwise had on the public. In fact, in the 
early stages of the pre-referendum campaign, P.O.W.E.R. Now 
explained that it was concerned that opposing views would get 
buried under the "media blitz 11 planned by OUC and Energy for 
Tomorrow (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, August 6, 1984, p. C-1). 
"I think people need to hear both sides to make an honest 
judgment, but we don't have the money to match them dollar for 
advertising do}lar, 11 says P.O.W.E.R. Now spokesman Roger Gaines. 
Besides, Gaines states that he and fellow opponents of the plant 
were angry at OUC for using "ratepayers money to fight ratepayers" 
instead of implementing conservation programs (Simmons, The 
Orlando Sentinel, August 16, 1984, p. A-1). 
Despite their poor financial status, however, critics of the 
Stanton power facility continued their fight to stop construction 
of the plant. With a little over $5,000 in contributions and dues 
from members and supporters, P.O.W.E.R. Now embarked on a city-wide 
volunteer phone drive, asking residents to vote against the new 
OUC plant. In addition, the organization prepared a · four-page 
tabloid and, with assistance from the Sierra Club members, mounted 
a door-to-door campaign throughout Orlando's 44 voting precincts 
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985). 
According to P.O.W.E.R. Now president Cornell, her organization 
wanted "to put a paper on the doorstep of each of Orlando's 60,000 
registered voters. In addition to door-to-door canvassing, P.O.W.E.R. 
Now in collaboration with the Sierra Club and Citizens for 
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Conservation--a new group also opposing the Stanton plant--planned 
a media campaign, which urged voters to side with the OUC critics. 
Like the other publicity efforts, however, this last-ditch attempt 
by opponents to gain public support was hampered by limited funds 
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985). 
Citizens for Conservation was organized approximately three 
weeks before the referendum at the promptings of Sierra Club 
spokesman Irby Pugh. Like the Sierra Club, which raised about 
r 
$2,000 in contributions from sympathizers, Citizens for 
Conservation received no corporate support toward its campaign 
against the OUC power plant. Instead, the 12-member organization 
depended heavily on press coverage and on the free time donated 
by area media to get its message out (Gworek, personal communication, 
March 1, 1985). 
Elaborating on this point, Walt Gworek, Chairman of the 
Citizens for Conservation, states that the advertisements backing 
the referendum were possible only because of federal law, which 
requires that broadcasters provide equal time for opposing views on 
controversial views. Three local television stations and three radio 
stations donated time for plant opponents' views after Gworek 
requested equal time to rebut OUC's advertisements. WFTV-Channel 
9, WOFL-Channel 35, WJYO-FM, WDBO-AM-FM and K-92-FM donated the 
air time accounting for nearly all of the $14,000 worth of help 
Citizens for Conservation received (Gworek, personal communication, 
March 1, 1985). 
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Like the opponents of the Stanton plant, Gworek and his 
colleagues rallied support around the issues of the need, environ-
mental impact and economics of the new coal-fired plant. Besides, 
Gworek states that his group was concerned with the way the OUC 
and the city of Orlando went about acquiring the site for the 
Stanton Energy Center. Plant opponents claim that the property 
on which the plant is being built was improperly acquired. 
However, criti~s have not substantiated this charge. The city 
used its condemnation power to get the property for the plant and 
a railroad spur. 11 Why did OUC mount such a massive campaign if the 
vote didn't matter?" Gworek asks. "There are a lot of different 
pieces that did not seem to fit together," (Gworek, personal 
communication, March 1, 1985). 
Apparently, the speculations and confusion expressed by 
Gworek reflected at least some broader feeling of the Orlando 
community, as charges and countercharges surfaced concerning the 
proposed plant. Turnout at the polls on September 4 was roughly 
similar to turnout in other referendum elections. Of the 60,000 
registered voters, only 21,395--roughly 37 percent--cast ballots. 
Sixty-five percent of the voters favored the referendum (City 
Clerk's election records). In 1978, a referendum on single 
member district attracted only 40 percent of .the city's registered 
voters to the polls. Again, in 1971 when voters were asked 
whether the city of Orlando should acquire property at Turkey Lake 
for a public recreational center, only about 32 percent cast 
85 
ballots (G. Chewning, personal communication, March 7, 1985). 
Commenting on the 65 percent voter support for the plant OUC 
board chairman claims, "The results really show a vote of confidence 
in the OUC, and the way the utility is being run" (Simmons, The 
0r1 and o Senti n e 1 , September 5 , 19 84 , p . A-1 ) . "Si m i1 a r 1 y , Energy 
for Tomorrow spokesman Harry Ferran states that "I'm very pleased. 
Now we can move ahead and get this power p 1 ant built on schedule" 
(The Orlando Septinel, September 5, 1984, p. A-1). 
For plant opponents, the results spelt 11 disappointment, 11 
though they admitted that they were not surprised by the outcome. 
We never had a chance against the $300,000 that OUC and Energy for 
Tomorrow spent on the campaign, 11 Gaines says as he conceded defeat. 
Besides, ciritics contend that "The city purposely acted to make 
the vote meaningless." According to Ramsdell, the vote might have 
been influenced by the $120 million spent on the plant before the 
referendum (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 5, 1984, p. 
B-1). Ramsdell claims that most of that money was spent since 
May 1983, when P.O.W.E.R. Now presented city officials with a 
petition signed by 12,000 Orlando voters calling for a referendum. 
The referendum asked residents if they supported or opposed 
the city of Orlando's participation in the power plant project. 
Critics argue that the wording of the refere~dum question lacked 
clarity. The actual wording is as follows: 
Shall the Charter and Code of the City of Orlando be 
changed by the addition of sections to prohibit the 
City from constructing or assisting in any way in the 
construction of any coal-fired electrical plant in 
Orange County? (Energy for Tomorrow, August 1984). 
Because of the wording of this question, a 11 No 11 vote 
indicated support for the plant, a "Yes" vote meant opposition. 
,. 
E_conomi c Stake 
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Although the legal and political struggle culminating in the 
city-wide referendum revolved primarily around environmental and 
economic considerations, there was another important factor which 
added fuel to the fight against the OUC power plant. An observation 
by William A. Gamson best illustrates this latter dimension of the 
opposition. 
Rancorous conflicts, Gamson contends, often stem from the 
belief by an opposition that "norms about the waging of political 
conflict •.. have been violated." Consequently, "actions occur 
which produce a shared belief that tactics used to influence the 
outcome are 'dirty,' 'underhanded,' 'vicious'" (Gamson, 1966, p. 71). 
Critics of the Stanton plant have repeatedly charged that some 
of the individuals and agencies responsible for approving the 
project were not disinterested parties and therefore could not 
have acted in the public's interest. The OUC decision makers, 
these opponents argue, bypassed an economically-viable 
conservation plan and recommended that a new facility be built 
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because they will gain from the plant's construction. "This is a 
prime example of economic interest winning over public interest," 
Pugh says of the OUC's decision (Pugh, personal communication, 
October 12, 1984). 
According to the Sierra Club and other opponents, OUC's 
consulting engineers recommended the building of the facility 
despite clear indications that it may not be needed. "It's not 
rational to depend on Black and Veatch to study the need for the 
plant when they will profit so much from its construction," Pugh 
argues. The Sierra Club contends that Black and Veatch will make 
$20 million on the coal-fired plant (Pugh, personal communication, 
October 12, 1984). 
The OUC consultants will not be the only business to gain from 
the Stanton Energy center. "We hate to see it not built, because 
it will give a real boost to the local economy," states Richard 
Coleman of the association of Builders and Contractors in Winter 
Park. Coleman explained that contractors were expected to get 
about $300 million worth of contracts and another $200 million 
would go to out of state business. Yet, the association itself 
was not a contributor to the OUC media campaign, but individual 
members of the association did contribute to the pro-plant 
campaign. Westinghouse Electric Corporation.'s steam generator 
division in Orlando will gain from the building of the power 
plant. Westinghouse has more than $29.1 million in contracts to 
build a turbine generator and other parts for the plant. 
Westinghouse donated $1,000 to the pro-plant campaign (Nesbitt, 
Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, pp. A-1, A-4). 
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Gregory Presnell, an Orlando attorney for Westinghouse, confirmed 
that Westinghouse's action stemmed from fear of losing the contract 
with the utility if the court-ordered referendum had favored critics 
of the plant. "They've (Westinghouse) got a valid and binding 
contract with OUC and in that this litigation could damage and 
impair the futyre of the plant; it could damage Westinghouse," 
Presnell says (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 3, 1983, 
p. A-1). 
According to an OUC document dated August 16, 1983, the 
Westinghouse contract was one of 34 the utility awarded for a total 
contract value of $155 million before Graham and the Cabinet 
approved the plant in 1982 (OUC contract report, August 16, 1983). 
Financial companies, too, have a stake in the power facility 
being built. OUC financial advisers confirmed that the investment 
bankers chosen "to put together" and market the utility's bonds 
will share approximately $6.5 million as reward for their involvement 
in bond-selling (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 
1983, pp. A-1, A-6). Of this amount, about $800,000 went to bankers 
who put the bond issue together, promoted it, and recruited others 
for the venture. Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, 
E. F. Hutton, and Leedy Wheeler and Alleman, an Orlando broker, were 
the coordinators of the bond sale. Most of these companies contributed 
to the OUC media campaign. E. F. Hutton and Merrill Lynch, for 
example, each donated $1,00 (Energy for Tomorrow's contribution 
report, The Orlando Sentinel, December 6, 1982, p. B-1). 
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The bond-selling venture also induced former OUC board member 
· Richard Weiner to resign his post with the utility in July 1983, 
so he could bid on the bonds, critics allege. Weiner says he 
resigned because his work did not allow him enough time for the 
11 pressing needs of the OUC. 11 But according to OUC member Grace 
Lindblom, Wein~ was urged by his employer, Shearson-American 
Express Inc., to resign so it could bid for some of the utility's 
bond business. "The firm has not been able to participate to the 
extent it would like in underwriting some of OUC's bonds because 
Dick (Weiner) is on the board, 11 Lindbloom states (Simmons, The 
Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-1). 
In addition, organized labor and other workers also could 
make as much as $66.9 million from the Stanton Energy Center, a 
Sentinel report states. Expanding on this observation, the 
report explains that labor leaders have won an argument from OUC 
that required union and non-union contractors to pay wages that 
are slightly higher than current wage scales (Ibid). The 
agreement called for a minimum hourly wage of $9.62 for unskilled 
laborers employed on the Stanton power plant. After two years of 
construction workers will get 5 percent raises. OUC electric 
manager Lou Stone said the agreement increased the cost of the 
plant by about $1 million, but provided protection against strikes 
(The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. A-6). 
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Apart from the consulting engineers, the investment bankers, 
and the unions, the Orange County government has been singled out 
as another body supporting the plant, in the hopes of benefitting 
from its construction. According to the Sierra Club, the county 
commission plans to give treatment sewage to OUC, and has already 
benefitted from the utility's decision to help pay for building a 
road for a developer near the plant. The county commission's 
position on the power plant 11 is becoming a political issue, 11 ,. 
Pugh charges (Scherberger, The Orlando Sentinel, August 20, 1982, 
p. B-1). 
Thus, while the Stanton Energy Center may help customers to 
lower their future electricity bills, it also helps the consultants, 
contractors, financiers, laborers and county government who benefit 
directly from its construction. 
The Opposition's Strategy 
Opposition to the Stanton Energy Center developed somewhat 
haphazardly. In fact, some of the OUC critics argue that little or 
no attempt had been made by their own various opposition groups to 
establish any form of network in presenting their case against OUC. 
According to Cornell, inter-group rivalry, difficulty in 
recruiting committed members, and inadequate media coverage were the 
primary factors which mitigated against the oppostion movement. 
Each organization, including P.O.W.E.R. Now, operated almost 
autonomously throughout the pre-referendum campaign Cornell states 
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985). 
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Cornell states that she was amazed at how "politics can get in 
the way of public interest. 11 She explains that P.O.W.E.R. Now's hopes 
for a unified struggle against OUC were shattered when members of 
the Young Republicans started expressing dissatisfaction with the way 
certain organizational activities had been proceeding. According to 
Cornell, the Young Republicans' offer to join forces with P.O.W.E.R. 
Now for the suit against the city of Orlando was indeed a welcome 
gesture. No sooner, however, had both organizations started 
working together, the Young Republicans began to complain that they 
"weren't getting enough publicity." Complaints of this nature, she 
says, were often accompanied by absenteeism and genera 1 uncooperati veness 
(Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985). 
Eventually, the Young Republicans dissociated themselves from 
P. 0. W. E. R. Now. 
The collaboration between P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Sierra Club 
became slacked off as time progressed. When P.O.W.E.R. Now 
organized in April 1982, it was Sierra Club attorney and spokesman 
Irby Pugh who gave the main address at the initial organizational 
meeting. At that particular meeti.ng, Pugh tried to convince people 
that the power plant would create more harm than good, and he 
implored those present to join the fight against the project 
(Abrahams, The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 1982·, pp. 8-1, B-7). 
At the same organizational meeting, P.O.W.E.R. Now's founder 
distributed handbills quoting club member Barney Capehart as saying 
"power bills would rise $150 a month after the Stanton Energy Center 
began operation" (Abrahams, The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 1982, 
p. B-1). Essentially, Capehart and Pugh's messages became the 
message of P.O.W.E.R. Now. 
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However, as Pugh himself acknowleged in a statement quoted 
earlier in this chapter, the Sierra Club became dissillusioned 
after losing the court case against OUC, asking for a new 
certification hearing on the power plant. Consequently, enthusiasm 
dissipated and the organization's involvement in joint anti-Stanton 
~ 
activities decreased considerably. According to Cornell, the 
Sierra Club did help in distributing fliers prior to the referendum, 
but that was the extent of the cooperation between the two groups 
after Pugh's loss in court (Cornell, personal communication, March 
3, 1985). 
On the whole, each organization operated autonomously, but 
there were clear signs of informal networking among them. 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of this phenomenon was the 
extent to which group membership overlapped. For example, many 
of P.O.W.E.R. Now's members were also members of the· Sierra Club 
and vice versa. Some more specific examples will better illustrate 
the nature of this overlapping of organizational membership. Bill 
Kirk, president of the Isle of Pines Homeowners Association, was 
also an active Sierra Club member, Belle Isle City councilman, Mo 
Rigante and Maitland Mayor Blaschka, whose cities protested the 
OUC coal route through their neighborhoods, were also members of 
Citizens for Conservation (Gworek, personal communication, March 
93 
1, 1985, The Orlando Sentinel, August 9, 1984, p. B-1). 
In addition to group overlapping, the periodic emergence of 
new protest organizations throughout the pre-referendum campaign 
also indicates that there was at least some loose collaboration 
among the various groups. "We were very much in touch with the 
people of P.O.W.E.R. Now," Gworek states. He explains as well that 
both the Sierra Club and P.O.W.E.R. Now suggested the formation of 
Citizens for Canservation as a means of exerting additional pressure 
on OUC and attract more publicity. 11 The reason we formed was 
basically to be another group that was opposed to the plant, and 
to get as much publicity as possible," Gworek says (personal 
communication, March 1, 1985). 
Additionally, Gworek states that Citizens for Conservation was 
perceived as a "counter group" for Energy for Tommorrow, confirming 
the belief that the birth of the opposition group on the heels 
of a pro-OUC organization was by no means a coincidence, but 
rather another carefully-calculated effort by the opposition to 
stop construction of the Stanton Energy Center. 
There was only one organization which admittedly modified its 
strategy opposing the power plant. Unlike P.O.W.E.R. Now, which 
organized for the sole purpose of "stopping the coal plant, 11 the 
Sierra Club initially wanted only to ensure that if the plant 
were built, it would be "as clean as possible." But more and 
more we became convinced that the plant would be an economic 
burden for OUC customers, so we began opposing it on this ground 
as well, 11 Pugh states (Pugh, personal communication, October 12, 
1984). 
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As club members and other experts continued uncovering facts 
supporting the environmental and economic arguments raised against 
the · power center, the Sierra Club finally switched to opposing 
the actual construction of the plant (Pugh, personal communication, 
October 12, 1984). 
The Role of the Media 
The absence of persistent, formal networking among the 
various opposition groups was but one of the many problems 
undermining the organizations' impact in the struggle over the 
proposed plant. Equally formidable was what plant critics, 
including Cornell and Pugh, describe as the "lack of cooperation 
from the media. 11 
"We had absolutely no cooperation from the media ... in my 
opinion, 11 Cornell states (Cornell, personal communication, March 
3, 1985). Expressing the same view, Pugh claims that valuable 
information supporting his organization's charges against the 
OUC "never got past the editors 11 (Pugh, personal communication, 
October 12, 1984). 
Elaborating on the charges that the media played no role in 
enhancing the opposition's case against ouc, .cornell contends that 
the "little" time most of the local media allotted for coverage 
opposing views came under the provision of the "fairness doctrine," 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The Orlando Sentinel, for 
95 
example, refused to give any form of support to OUC critics, 
Cornell charges. Channel 9, Cornell says, gave some coverage to 
OUC critics during the ea r ly stages of the struggle, but this 
ended when the opposition started unearthing information 
supporting some of the allegations leveled against the utility's 
new power plant (Cornell, personal communication, March 3, 1985). 
According to Cornell, a Channel 9 reporter lost his job with 
the station when he attempted to break a story on the "hidden truth" 
surrounding ownership and acquisition of the property on which 
the coal-fired plant is being constructed. Other media, including 
Channel 6, received leads on the same story from OUC critics, but 
refused also to investigate the matter, Cornell states (personal 
communication, March 3, 1985). 
But both television stations denied parts of these 
allegations. 
Channel 9 news editor Ron Comings admits that Jan Fisher, a 
former reporter assigned to cover the coal-plant controversy, · was 
relieved of that responsibility and eventually fired .not because 
he attempted to break any story relating to the OUC plant, but 
because "Jan wasn't doing his job" (Comings, personal communication, 
Ma re h 7 , 1985) . 
According to Comings, Fisher, who was "drawn into the camp 
of the opposition," did attempt to broadcast a story on the 
alleged irregularities characterizing the methods employed by 
both the city of Orlando and the OUC to acquire the property for 
the plant, but "the story was killed because Jan had not 
thoroughly investigated it." There was no evidence to support 
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the charges, Comings says (personal communication, March 7, 1985). 
In response to the charge that the media, including Channel 
9, downplayed the opposition's case, Comings states that: 
We gave adequate exposure to opponents of the plant, 
but that group of people always assumed that we were 
supporting the OUC ... that OUC had us in their back 
pockets. They refused to believe that we were 
attacking the issue as aggressively as possible 
(Comings, personal communication, March 7, 1985). 
Comings further explains that Channel 9, in an editorial, 
did come out in support of the power plant eventually, because 
"we were satisfied that the plant was needed. OUC executives 
were able to convince us that economically, the coal plant would 
help the community." In addition, Comings says the management of 
Channel 9 was also satisfied with the explanation OUC furnished 
for having selected the east Orange county location ~or the plant. 
According to Comings, OUC claimed that economic and environmental 
considerations were among the factors influencing the site 
selection (Comings, personal communication, March 7, 1985). 
Like Channel 9, Channel 6 contends that it gave fair and 
ample coverage to the arguments of both OUC and its critics. Ed 
Bates, executive producer of Channel 6 states that throughout the 
debate generated by the new plant, his station "remained neutral. 
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We took no position either way; we were just giving information 
to the public. As a news department, we don't take issues, we 
just report issues" (Bates, personal cof1111unication, March 7, 1985). 
In addition to regular coverage of activities on the plant 
controversy, Channel 6 aired an hour-long call-in program for 
the public to express its views on the project, Bates explains. 
Basically, this program aimed at "clarifying a lot of the talk that 
had been going on about the plant for the voters" (Bates, personal 
... 
communication, March 7, 1985). 
He also claims that at no time had Channel 6 failed to keep the 
public informed of any developments involving the power plant. 
According to Bates, a reporter, who no longer works with the 
station, had mentioned on several occasions that she had 11 a great 
story" but said she was "afraid" to break it. The reporter, 
apparently alluding to the alleged irregularities surrounding the 
property acquired for the Stanton plant, left "without giving us 
the vaguest idea of what she had been talking about" (Bates, 
personal communication, March 7, 1985). 
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Sierra Club advocates argue that, like the 
electronic media, local newspapers gave only limited and biased 
coverage to opposing views. The Orlando Sentinel, the only major 
daily newspaper in the community, has been singled out by plant 
critics as the chief offender. 
However, careful examination of the plant-related stories 
carried by The Orlando Sentinel between 1978 and 1983 not only 
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suggest that the issue in question had been extensively investigated, 
but also reported without apparent newsworthy bias. Generally, the 
newspaper's stories informed readers of the developments of the 
issue--OUC's proposals, the oppositions's challenges, and the 
outcome of subsequent lawsuits. Of the 110 power-plant stories 
examined by the author of this study, 74--about 70 percent--
carried headlines reflecting the activities of opponents. 
The remainjng stories largely highlighted the 11 action-
reaction11 character of the debate between OUC and its critics. 
Here are some examples of the plant-related story headlines: 
11 Critics: Stanton Plant will Discourage Conservation," "Coal-Fired 
Plant Won't Save as Much as Forecast, Report Says, 11 and "Conservation-
ists Join Opposition to Coal-Fired Plant. 11 
Among the stories reviewed, there is one--an in-depth article 
titled "Oil vs Coal: An Argument that may Backfire on OUC"-- in 
which The Sentinel speculates on the future of the new power plant. 
"The Sentinel , 11 the story reads, 11 has spent more than three months 
looking at the economic and political pros and cons of the Stanton 
plant. The project .•. uncovered a number of problems that could 
turn the plant into a white elephant." The problems here alluded to 
were those repeatedly raised by the opposition--higher utility bills, 
excess supply of energy, and the OUC promoting consumption instead 
of conservation (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 
13, 1983, pp. A-1, A-14). 
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A content analysis of The Sentinel editorials over the same 
period in question reveal a great deal of fluctuation in the 
paper's position on the Stanton power plant. However, only about 
20 percent of the editorials on the plant support OUC critics. 
For example, in a September 1983 editorial titled "OUC Foes 
Deserve Day in Court," The Sentinel notes that OUC officials had been 
considering asking an appeal court to require the Sierra Club, 
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Central Florida Young Republicans to buy 
... 
11 expensive 11 bonds to defray the cost of further delays on the plant, 
resulting from lawsuits filed by critics. 
But according to The Sentinel, 
OUC's concern about the cost of delays is well founded. 
After all, utility officials contend that the delays 
are costing perhaps as much as $3.7 million a month, 
although the opponents say the costs are nowhere near 
that, if any at all. Regardless of who is right on 
that one, there's a larger issue here. It is the same 
issue of how we settle difference of opinions and how 
citizens oppose decisions made by those in authority. 
Ultimately, it involves whether citizens can "fight 
City Hall." It is part of what keeps America talking 
across tables instead of shouting across streets. 
Short-circuiting the legal process by making it too 
expensive for the opponents is unacceptable. The 
process may be tiring. It may even be subject to 
exploitation for personal gain, and it is clearly 
expensive, but it is a system that works (Dunn, The 
Orlando Sentinel, September 13, 1983, p. A-18). 
In like manner, The Orlando Sentinel ran editorials which 
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may be considered supportive of the OUC--these accounted for about 
55 percent of those plant-related editorials reviewed by the author. 
Having learned of plant critics' intention of launching the 
referendum campaign, The Orlando Sentinel responded with an 
r 
editorial which questioned not only the wisdom of the opposition's 
action, but also the "zealousness among some of the petition pushers." 
According to the editorial: 
We are as dedicated to the principle of democracy 
as anyone, but government by referendum has its 
limits. An obvious one is in deciding such complex 
matters as when a new generating plant is to be built 
and what fuel it should use (Haile, The Orlando Sentinel, 
February 11, 1983, p. A-18). 
Also, in the period immediately before the referendum, The 
Sentinel ran several pro-OUC editorials with titles such as: 
11 0UC Plant is a Look Ahead, 11 "Give OUC Go-Ahead on Plant," and 
11 Get on With the OUC Plant. 11 
Perhaps the most profound, explicit and far-reaching of 
the editorials was that published on August 22, 1984, a little 
more than a week before the city-wide referendum. After a brief 
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historical account of the development of the Stanton Energy Center, 
the editor proceeded to ask: 
What should voters do? They ought to support the 
Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center because getting on 
with the plant is in the best interest of the 
community . . . Legalities aside, should the plant 
be built? Yes, not only because OUC already has 
sunk a hefty $120 million into it but also because 
the Orlando area would be better off with the plant 
(The Orlando Sentinel, August 22, 1984, p. A-14). 
Again on September 3, 1984--the day before the referendum--
an editorial, titled 11 0UC Plant is a Look Ahead, 11 stated that: 
The question of the OUC plant is not something we 
have taken lightly. For the past three years, we 
have talked continually with people on all sides of 
the issue. We have talked with the experts as well 
as with armchair observers. More than once we have 
debated the issue among ourselves. We believe that 
OUC is right; the plant should be built ... looking 
to the future is what the new coal-fired power plant 
in east Orange County is all about. Voters should 
say "no." Let the plant continue with ·no more 
hitches (Healy, The Orlando Sentinel, September 
3, 1984, p. A-18). 
Similarly, in an editorial two weeks before the referendum, 
William H. Turpin of the weekly Orlando Business Journal states 
that . 11 0UC provides cheap, reliable service--has the second 
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lowest electric rate among major Florida cities at $70.55 a month 
for 1,000 kilowatt hours." Turpin then asks: "Is there an 
alternate way of providing power for Central Florida's 
dramatic growth, both present and future? . The citizens of 
Orlando should vote in favor of the plant and the city participation" 
r 
(Turpin, 1984, p. 6). 
Prior to siding with OUC, most of The Orlando Sentinel's 
editorials mirrored the same kind of objectivity perceived in its 
plant-related news stories. Not only had the newspaper, on 
occasions, warned OUC to "guard against getting locked into a mind 
set of 'By golly, we are right and that's it"' but it also 
implored the utility's commissioners to "make sure there is no 
spite against those opposing the plant" (Dunn, The Orlando 
Sentinel, October 10, 1983, p. A-18). 
In addition to warning against self-righteousness· and malice, 
The Orlando Sentinel also reprimanded OUC for having demonstrated 
ignorance on some crucial matters relating to the new coal-fired 
plant. The paper notes, for example, that when the city of 
Lakeland--one of the original partners in the power plant venture--
pulled out of the deal, not one of the five commissioners on the OUC 
board could say how this action would affect consumer's monthly bills. 
Commenting on the apparent lack of expertise on the subject in 
question, The Orlando Sentinel argues that: 
No doubt there will be serious questions as to how a 
$546 million plant could have gotten this far along 
without a solid idea of who's in and who's out. 
Were it not for lawsuits by environmentalists 
opposed to the proposed plant, OUC would already be 
in New Yor~ trying to sell the bonds needed to build 
it (Dunn, The Orlando Sentinel, March 26, 1983, p. A-18). 
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Although the precise impact of the media on the outcome of the 
fight over the Stanton Energy Center cannot be determined from the 
data in this work, it was clear, however, that they did play a 
crucial role in disseminating information to the public. Equally 
obvious was the fact that much of this information came from OUC 
and its allies, whose wealth and human resources enabled them to 
utilize the full potentials of the media to defeat plant opponents. 
The overwhelming support from local as well as out-of-state firms, 
backed by OUC's strong organizational structure formed the very 
foundation upon which the OUC built and sustained its effective 
media program. 
Plant opponents, on the other hand, lacked these essential 
i ngredi en ts, and as a resu 1 t had only 1 i mi te.d access to the media. 
Lack of coordination and financial resources in particular were 
the factors contributing most to the low-keyed media campaign and 
subsequent defeat of OUC critics. In addition, this author is of 
the opinion that had The Orlando Sentinel and other media 
endorsing the power plant given critics the same kind of support 
OUC received, especially on the eve of the referendum, OUC 
opponents might have fared better in the struggle. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POWER-PLANT ISSUE 
The case of the OUC coal-fired plant discussed in the 
preceeding chapters has highlighted, perhaps more than anything 
else, the dynamics of power at the community level. 
Up until fafrly recently, a disproportionate number of social 
scientists, _ who explored the concept of power, focused not on 
the local community, but rather on the topmost, national level. 
But this has changed considerably. Alluding to this change, 
Martin N. Marger (1981) states that: 
It is there (the national level) that the most 
encompassing and consequential issues are decided 
where such decisions affect everyone in the society. 
But we are also affected by what happens at lesser 
levels of power, particularly within the cities and 
towns where we live and work. Indeed the decisions 
of community political and economic elites are closer 
and more comprehensible to us than at any other level. 
Local economic leaders are better known than 
executives of the multi-national corporations, and 
local political leaders or their agents are dealt 
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with more frequently and directly than those of the 
federal government. Thus, although less significant 
for the society as a whole, the structures and processes 
of power at the community level bear some attention . 
. (p. 243) 
Marger {p. 243) states that unlike the local power structure, 
the national power structure is "too remote and perhaps too 
mysterious to analyze with clear-cut procedures and testable 
hypotheses. 11 
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Expressing similar sentiments to Marger's, Floyd Hunter (1953, 
p. 2) whose landmark study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia) 
was discussed in Chapter I, contends that 11 ••• the community 
is a primary place in which power relations can be most easily 
observed." 
This study of the Stanton Energy Center, which is an empirical 
examination of power relations in the Qrlando community, has drawn 
largely on the tradition established by researchers such as Hunter 
and the Lynds mentioned in Chapter I. Although the Lynds' study 
of Muncie, Indiana (Middletown) has been considered a "comprehensive 
sociological portrait" by some scholars of power, it nevertheless 
dealt considerably with the specific issue of local power (Marger, 
1981, p. 243). 
11 Who made the decisions in the community?" and "Who controlled 
the major institutions and resources?" are key questions in these 
forementioned works and in the present study of the OUC power-plant 
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study. The author's interviews with local decison. makers as well as 
observation of local decision. makers, and the investigation of 
interest group operations bring to light discernible patterns of 
power in the Orlando community. 
Since much of the political interest generated throughout the 
fight over the plant resulted from the direct and active involvement 
of the various community groups, it seems appropriate that a detailed 
analysis of the 9pposition posed by these organizations and the 
subsequent impact in the issue in question be attempted. A brief 
general discussion of the nature and function of groups in the 
political system seems an ideal preface to the primary concern of 
group impact on the OUC power plant. 
The function of groups in American politics has long been a 
major preoccupation among political scientists. Marger (1981, p. 43) 
notes that ·the interest group version of pluralism "sees associations 
acting as pressure groups upon government ... supporting isssues 
and political actions of importance to their members. They serve 
as a means by which individuals with common interests may exert 
influence on decision. makers by collective action." 
Marger's view mirrors that of David Truman (1951), a mid-
twentieth century group theorist who saw organizational membership 
as the primary means by which individuals could "influence and 
ultimately control" decision makers. Truman, who has been credited 
with engineering the concept of "potential groups," portrayed 
the U.S. political system as basically revolving around the 
interplay of many varied interest or pressure groups--the 
assumption that all interests affected by an issue will be 
represented . 
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Similarly, Dahl (1967, p. 145), also a major exponent of pluralism, 
defines "the normal American political process as one in which . 
an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself 
heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of 
decision. 11 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the core of Dahl's theory is the 
division of political power into many different seats. In Dahl's 
words, 11 The fundamental axiom in the theory and practice of 
American pluralism is, I" believe, this: Instead of a single 
center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of 
power, none of which is or can be wholly sovereign 11 (Dahl, 1967, p. 24). 
From Dahl's standpoint, bargaining negotiation, and compromise are 
still the basic characteristics of the U.S. pluralist system. 
However, as Marger (1981) points out, it is now "bargaining, 
negotiating and compromise among elites which preserve democracy." 
The most poignant vindication of group pluralism in 
America comes from Rose (1967, p. 247) who states that: 
Through the voluntary association, the ordinary 
citizen can acquire as much power in the .community 
or the nation as his free time, ability and inclinations 
permit him to, without actually going into government 
service, provided he accepts the competition for power 
of other like-minded citizens •.. Political power or 
influence in the United States is not concentrated 
in the government, but it is distributed over as 
many citizens, working through their associations 
as want to take the responsibility for power. 
But neither Rose nor his pluralist disciples have been able 
to convince other scholars of power that groups are indeed the 
definers, operators, and movers within the U.S. political 
f' 
process. In a scathing critic1sm of the pluralist conception of 
group function Gamson (1972, p. 61) states that: 
The pluralist interpretation of the American political 
system seems to make sense of a great body of historical 
and contemporary experience. Yet, there is reason to 
doubt that it captures the full truth; rather, it is a 
partial truth that misses or blurs certain problems 
and paints an overly sanguine picture of the operation 
of power in American society. 
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Gamson ·(1972, p. 61) argues that pluralists, Like ·Dahl, who view 
the American system as multiple centers of power which help "to 
tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts 
peacefully," tend to regard urban violence and the considerable 
history of violent conflict in this country as "abnormalities or 
pathologies, arising from the gap between an always imperfect 
reality and an ideal abstract model. 11 
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Other political scientists, including Parenti and 
Schattschneider, have also rejected the interest-group version of 
pluralism because of its inherent class bias. Participation of 
almost any kind in the political process is limited to higher 
class and status groups, critics of pluralism contend. 
Expanding on this observation, Parenti (1970, pp. 52-53) argues 
that "The belief that lower-strata groups exercise a constant, albeit 
indirect, power remains an article of faith rather than a 
demonstrated proposition. 11 Parenti 's assertion stemmed from his 
study of the way local government officials responded to three 
issues actively fought by residents of a ghetto area of Newark in 
the mid-1960s. The author concluded that since active lower-class 
groups were unsuccessful in influencing decision makers, there was 
even less reason to think they might wield influence when inactive. 
In his allusion to the impotence of lower-class groups in 
the U.S. political system, Schattschneider (1975, pp. 34-35) 
argues that: 
The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. 
Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot 
get into the pressure system. 
Interest group pluralism has been criticized not only for its 
pro-business and class bias, but also for its divisive potentials 
and the crippling effects it has on the institution of government. 
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According to Theodore J. Lowi (1979~ p. 36), pluralism is not 
without merit, 11 but the zeal of pluralism for the group and its 
belief in a natural harmony of group competition tended to break 
down the very ethic of government by reducing the essenti a 1 
conceptions of government to nothing more than another set of 
mere interest groups." 
Expressing a similar view, Harvard University President 
Derek Bok clai that: 
;-
America no longer seems diverse so much as it seems 
split asunder into innumerable special interests. When 
so many groups organize to protect their special 
interests, the politics of activism can become the 
politics of immobility, and we find ourselves unable 
to reach effective solutions for inflation, energy 
shortages, environmental issues, or other national 
problems (Bok's work (cited in Wooten, 1985)). 
If Bok and his colleagues are right, then one can speculate 
that the activities of the groups which opposed the OUC power 
plant might have been counterproductive, simply because too many 
dissenting voices were involved. However, before making such a 
generalization, one should carefully consider the counter-
arguments on group activism in the political system. Furthermore, 
no analysis of group function and performance is complete without 
an examination of the resources available to each group and the 
political climate in which it operates. 
P.O.W.E.R. Now, the Sierra Club, Citizens for Conservation 
and all the other groups which fought to stop construction of the 
Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center describe themselves as grass 
roots organizations. This categorization militated against these 
advocacy groups battling a giant utility such as OUC. 
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William T. Gormley's (1983) summary of differences between grass 
roots advocacy organizations and what he calls proxy advocacy organ-
... 
izations underscores some of the odds with which opponents of the 
Stanton plant contended. Proxy advocates is defined as government 
organizations that represent residents of a particular jurisdiction 
in another government organization's proceedings. Grass-roots 
organizations, on the other hand, are private organizations that 
promote interests unrelated to their members' occupations. 
Among other things, Gormley (1983, p. 87) states that: (1) proxy 
advocates are much better funded than grass roots advocates--in 
general, grass roots advocates lack the resources to participate eff-
ectively in certain issue areas; (2) proxy advocates possess greater 
expertise than grass root advocates. Additionally, Gormley 
notes that grass roots advocates seldom support higher utility 
rates, but they strongly endorse conservation. 
As Gormley points out, "effective participation" in certain 
areas of community politics is largely dependent upon the amount 
of resources a group has at its disposal. Resources, which are 
a major yardstick for measuring power, take many forms, including 
wealth, property, prestige, knowledge and expertise, and access 
to or control of communicat i on outlets. 
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With this definition of resources, one can almost safely say 
that one of--if not the foremost--obstacles faced by OUC's 
opponents was lack of financial resources. During their three-
year fight with OUC, critics of the Stanton plant managed to amass 
less than $10,000, most of which came from members and supporters 
of the various opposition groups. 
The inferior financial status of these organizatons was 
further dramatized when measured against the resources OUC had at 
its disposal. For the media campaign alone, the utility forked 
out $175,000, adding to the $100,000 raised by Energy for Tomorrow 
for the same purpose. 
It is no wonder, then, .that this striking economic disparity 
between OUC and its foes not only caught the attention of several 
observers, but also seemed to have generated some sympathy. 
Discussing the OUC-related call-in program aired by his 
station prior to the referendum, WCPX-Channel 6 program producer 
Mike Cerni states that: 
One of the problems I've run into producing this thing 
(program) is that OUC and Energy for Tomorrow have so 
much more money than the other folks and a better 
strategy for informing the public. The other groups 
just don't have that much money, and the information 
from them has been somewhat limited (Cerni, The Orlando 
Sentinel, August 30, 1984, p. E-1). 
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In a similar vein, Pugh says ''Telling the story is not 
enough without money. It is very hard to tell a story in today's 
economic climate unless you have a direct economic stake in the 
project" (Hurvitz, Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984, 
p. 8). 
Both Cerni rand Pugh allude to a related, more far-reaching 
dimension of the disadvantageous position in which plant critics 
found themselves. They had limited access to the media. The 
consequence of this inaccessibility has been aptly described by 
Mills (1956, p. 314), who claims that "The freedom to raise issues 
effectively seems more and more to be confined to those few interests 
that have ready and continual access to these Media." 
Hinting at this formidable roadblock confronted by critics of 
the power plant~ The Orlando Sentinel also contends that one 
"serious flaw of the plant review process was that qualified 
opponents lacked an expanded forum for their arguments" (Haile, 
The Orlando Sentinel, February 11, 1983, p. A-18). 
Considering the impact of the media on public opinion, one 
should be able to easily appreciate why OUC and Energy for 
Tomorrow, which outspent their opponents $20 to $1 on mail-outs, 
newpaper, radio and television advertisements convinced a majority 
of Orlando's voters to support the power plant. Describing the 
intensity of the OUC campaign, Pugh claims there were as many as 
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10 television advertisements per day in the last few weeks of the 
referendum (Pugh, Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984, p. 8). 
Data gathered for this paper suggest that had plant critics 
been able to match the advertising outlay of the OUC and its 
ally, the public debate and the legal struggle might have been 
altered considerably, and as a result, the outcome of the 
referendum might have been different. 
, 
One indication that seems to support this speculation was a 
telephone poll conducted by The Sentinel in November 1983. Of 
3,518 Orlando residents who were asked if OUC should build the 
new coal-fired power plant, 2,636--75 percent--voted 11 no 11 while 
882 voted 11 yes 11 (The Orlando Sentinel, November 15, 1983, p. B-1). 
According to The Sentinel, skepticism of government and concern 
for the environment appeared to have been the primary reasons three 
out of four respondents opposed the plant. 
But there was a drastic change of opinion only a year later. 
Support for the power facility had increased to 37 percent of the 
voters polled in August 1984, but now only 27 percent opposed it. 
The remaining 36 percent was undecided. The day of the 
referendum, voter support for the Stanton Energy Center had 
jumped to a whopping 65 percent, compared to 35 percent 
opposing (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, September 3, pp. A-1, A-12). 
It is not possible to say what degree of the shift in 
public opinion resulted directly from the massive media campaign 
undertaken by OUC and Energy for Tomorrow prior to the referendum, 
since variables other than advertising might have influence The 
Sentinel poll results. However, it seems fair to assume that 
advertising was one of the variables contributing to OUC's 
success at the polls. 
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In fact, one observer, David Hurvitz, attributes the 
success directly to the 11 intensive, last-minute advertising and 
public relations effort by the OUC and its supporters" (Hurvitz, 
Public Relations Business, September 24, 1984, p. 1). 
An advertising campaign of the kind undertaken by OUC, 
according to Mills (1956, p. 315) provides the public with an 
education not for knowledge and citizen responsibility, but rather 
for economic training to better serve the elites. The media, Mills 
further explains, "are . among the most important of those 
increased means of power now at the dispoaal of elites of wealth 
and power." 
But throughout its media campaign, OUC justified its action 
as a necessary measure for ensuring that customers were properly 
informed of the benefits they would derive from the new power 
plant, and the consequences the community would suffer without 
the facility. Although this was indeed a credible explanation from 
the perspective of the OUC, evidence cited by plant critics 
supports the latter's allegations that there was also a "hidden 
agenda" in OUC's fight for the power plant. Much of the data 
presented in this work seems to support the opposition's claim 
that many of the orga~izations and people who proposed and 
joined forces to defeat the opposition, had a vested economic 
interest in the project. 
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Westinghouse, which built the generator for the plant; Black 
and Veatch, who did the final design work; and Mudge Rose, a firm 
involved in the issuance of OUC bonds; all contributed to the 
utility's media campaign. More than 95 percent of the $100,000 
raised by Energy for Tomorrow for OUC came from out of state firms, 
who overwhelmingly were going t9 directly gain financially from 
construction of the plant. 
The bias of the legal struggle was not confined to critics' 
inability to successfully compete with OUC's financial strength. 
Unlike its opponents, who were largely dependent on volunteer 
legal aid, OUC had at its disposal several full-time attorneys to 
carefully prepare its cases in defense of the power plant. 
Consequently, the utility's chances of presenting more convincing 
cases were much greater than those of their critics, who could not 
afford full-time counsel. 
Apart from overpowering its adversaries in the public forum, 
OUC further rendered its foes almost impotent by invoking a 
mobilization of bias against some crucial issues. Perhaps the 
most blatant display of this occurrence was the referendum 
itself. All through the struggle with OUC, critics emphasized 
that their opposition to the power plant stemmed from their 
convictions that the new facility would pollute the environment, 
result in higher electricity bills, and that it was unneeded. 
However, none of these concerns was raised by OUC in the 
referendum. 
that: 
As early as 1982, a spokesman for the Sierra Club stated 
The Sierra Club is not blindly obstructing progress 
in its opposition to this OUC coal-burning plant. If 
the new power plant were truly needed to supply electric 
, 
power for necessary customer service or economic growth, 
our position would be different. However, the known 
adverse environmental and social impacts coupled with 
the substantial economic risks are totally unacceptable 
when the plant is not needed (Entwistle, The Orlando 
Sentinel, April 24, 1982, p. A-18). 
Despite these explicit statements outlining these critics' 
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position, and despite the fact that most of the debate generated by 
the new plant centered on the broader questions of whether the 
plant was necessary, and if the city of Orlando shou.ld participate 
in the construction of the plant, the referendum on September 4, 
1984 addressed only the latter, and least important issue. 
Opponents, supporters and utility officials all had agreed that 
the real issue facing the voters was the 'need' question. 
As Ferran puts it, "When voters go to the polls, most will be 
basing their vote on whether they want the plant or don't want 
the plant. That's the heart of it" (Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, 
August 19, 1984, p. A-1). 
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But hardly could this have been the case on the day of election, 
since the chief issues around which the opposition had been built 
were systematically "organized out 11 of the decision-making 
process. As mentioned in Chapter I, the mobilization of 
bias is a common feature of the political game--some issues are 
organized into politics, while others, like the 'need' issue in 
the OUC case, are organized out. It was the OUC that decided what 
i' 
the game was about and subsequently decided what, in this instance, 
got in the game. 
While the utility sidestepped the question of need--keeping the 
issue in the realm of non-decision-making--it highlighted in its 
advertisements, for example, the fact that $120 million had already 
been spent on the plant. Obviously this was an important issue for 
OUC offi ci a 1 s, and was therefore treated accordingly. "With any 
project of this magnitude, you reach a pain~ where you must decide 
whether to defer or go ahead," OUC general manager Henry Luff 
explains. "We reached that point in April 1983, when the OUC 
board decided to go ahead with the project" (Simmons, The Orlando 
Sentinel, August 19, 1984, p. A-18). 
It is no wonder, then, that while OUC was battling its 
critics, it maintained that regardless of the outcome of the 
referendum the plant construction would be continued. 
Why, then, did OUC expend all this effort and money on a 
referendum that would in no way alter their plans for the power 
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plant? An observation by Mills sheds some light on this baffling 
occurrence. Mills (1956, p. 317) contends that: 
Authority 'formally' resides in the people, but 
the power of initiation is in fact held by small 
circles of men. That is why the standard strategy 
of manipulation is to make it appear that the 
people, or at least a large group of them, 'really 
~ 
made the decision.' 
Again, there is no conclusive evidence that the referendum 
was a manipulative weapon used by OUC and its supporters against 
its customers. However, Mills' theory should not be dismissed as 
a possible explanation for the referendum, considering especially 
the time lapse--five months--between the court ruling and the 
actual voting. Additionally, although the precise impact of the 
OUC-invoked mobilization of bias cannot now be determined, given 
the circumstantial evidence available, the author is inclined to 
believe the outcome of the referendum would have been different had 
the issues around which the controversy revolved appeared before 
the voters. 
In addition to invoking a mobilization of bias against key 
issues, OUC in its fight for the plant, apparently exploited other 
available resources beyond the reach of the opposition. If 
Thomas R. Dye (1972, p. 24) is correct, then it was the "wealth, 
organizational strength, leadership, access to decision makers, 
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and internal cohesion" of the OUC system that were responsible for 
the utility's victory over its critics. 
The pivotal role of these characteristics in defeating 
opposition in any controversial issue cannot be overemphasized. 
Obviously aware of this fact, OUC endeavored for the three-year 
period it battled plant opponents to present the public a united 
front at all times--at no time was there any indication of internal 
dissension or ~isloyalty. This is the kind of unity, solidarity 
or coherence of which Mills, Meisel and other scholars talk. 
According to elitist theorists, this kind of group 
consciousness and "common will of action" are exclusive preserves 
of society's elites--preserves which clearly make them "different 
from and more cohesive than those they govern" (Presthus, 1974, p. 334). 
These theorists, nevertheless, emphasize that cohesion without 
access to the point of decision can lose its efficacy in the 
political process. 
"Toward whatever institution of government we observe 
interest groups operating, the common feature of all their 
efforts is the attempt to achieve effective access to points of 
decision," Truman states. Access, Truman further argues, is their 
"intermediate facilitative objective" (Truman, 1951, pp. 264-265). 
In addition, Truman contends that a group's chance of 
attaining the desired access are determined by three variables: 
(1) the position of the organization in the social structure; 
(2) the skills and other qualities of leadership; and 
(3) effective organization in terms of the issue at stake. 
The third variable, means "knowing the ropes" and being 
sufficiently cohesive as an organization to enable its weight 
to be brought to bear 11 (Truman, 1951, pp. 198-200). 
But perhaps the most striking OUC-related case alluding to 
the crucial role of access in the political arena was that 
reported in The Orlando Sentinel in October 9, 1982. Frederick 
I' 
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Bryant, attorney for the Florida Municipal Power Association (FMPA), 
was chided by The Sentinel (1982) for 11 pouring politics on fire. 11 
In letters sent to 22 mayors across the state, Bryant states 
that 11 1 am requesting your help in contacting the governor and 
the Cabinet to express to them, 'as mayor of your city,• your 
desire that the plant be approved by the Cabinet." According 
to the Sentinel, Bryant included a form letter for the mayors 
to fil 1 out and ma i 1 in, and urged them to "make full use of 
whatever personal contacts" they could to lobby for the plant 
(The Orlando Sentinel, October 9, 1982, p. A-14). 
FMPA, a corporation of 33 small-city utilities that 
jointly finance larger power projects, had originally agreed to 
buy 38 percent of the Stanton Energy Center, but later changed 
its mind when individual cities, including Lakeland, decided they 
would not need the additional power. 
The question of how successful Bryant's networking was in 
this particular instance is immaterial. What matters here is an 
understanding that an individual such as Bryant could and would 
use his privileged position to get through to decision makers, · 
while other less powerful groups do not have access to this 
kind of resource. 
Presthus (1974) argues: 
The functional need for some process of integrating 
discrete social interests, of determining major social 
purposes and allocating the resources needed to achieve 
them--all require an ultimate coordinating instrument. 
The process by which these -ends are achieved may usually 
be conceptualized as one of the elite accommodation. 
Integrating the so-called private and public sectors 
is the essence of this process. (p. 332) 
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Based on his analysis of the Bryant case, the author of this 
study believes that accessibility to decisionmakers was one of the 
greatest advantages OUC had over its critics. Not only did the 
OUC have access to decision makers, but it also had the outright 
endorsement of some. After all, the OUC is a self-nominating 
commission that is confirmed by the Orlando City Counci _l. Orlando 
Mayor Bill Frederick, who is also an OUC board member, was one of 
the most vocal supporters of the power plant, and also the chief 
city official who decided against the original referendum proposal 
on the issue. 
As mentioned earlier, in the past 32 years the city council 
has rejected none of OUC's nominees for board membership. While 
this occurrence does not necessarily indicate any abnormality in 
administrative proceedings, it does infer the existence of the 
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kind of relationship Mills and other single-elite theorists 
claim to have found in elite-dominated societies. These theorists 
claim to have perceived among elites similar sociological 
characteristics, including interests, social backgrounds, outlook, 
and working relationship. The two last elements seem to best 
illustrate the unanimity displayed over the past 32 years by OUC 
and the Orlando City Council. 
Marger arg-ues: 
In addition to their common social characteristics, 
and perhaps of greater importance as a builder of 
cohesion among them, is their close working 
relationship. Because their institutions overlap 
functionally, elites of business, government, and 
military find themselves continually interacting 
with each other. (p. 212) 
Conclusion and Resolution 
Generally, this study has concerned itself with -the ingredients 
that define and sustain power in a community. As the data 
presented in this paper indicate, the concepts and operational 
definitions of power are as numerous and varied as the theorists 
themselves who postulate the findings on this rather polemic area 
of social science. 
In his quest to locate the locus of power in the Orlando 
community, the author of the OUC study centered his investigation 
around those who participated in the decision-making process from 
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which the power plant evolved. While the investigation of this 
matter has produced no definitive answers, numerous trends fitting 
the theoretical molds--particularly that of the single-elite 
theorist--were discernible. 
The most striking feature of events in the OUC controversy is 
the absence of mass participation of community-group involvement, 
especially during the formative stages of decision-making. It is 
worth noting that -0f the 16 agencies deciding the power plant's 
fate, not one was comprised of representatives of the vast 
majority of OUC customers. 
It is true, as Gormley (1983, pp. 94-98) points out, that 
issues such as the OUC's involve "technical complexity--the 
intellectual basis for decision-making." In addition, Gormley 
argues, a complexity is high when a policy problem requires 
understanding of a specialist or expert, "a professional appraisal 
more than a normative judgement. 11 
In such cases, therefore, it is imperative that decision 
makers assigned the responsibility of deciding crucial ·matters 
demonstrate appropriate expertise in their fields. OUC's 
claim that the individuals and agencies ruling on the power plant 
possessed the required expertise in their respective areas 
might be true. 
However, it appeared equally true that those opposing the 
plant were no less knowledgeable on the subject of controversy. 
To have refused from considering the opposition's arguments, OUC 
might have cheated itself out of invaluable information--
information that could have possibly saved the utility money, 
keep electric bills low, and enhanced the company's credibility. 
At no time during the debate on the plant's fate had OUC made 
any concessions rto its critics, except when forced by the court 
on the occasion of the referendum. Apart from this one instance, 
plans for the power facility proceeded, unaffected by continued 
protest from those purporting to represent the general public. 
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That OUC took no initiative to include the majority of its 
customers in the decision-making process, or to at least consider 
the claims of plant critics, was no violation of democratic norms, 
when viewed against single-elite theory. One of the fundamental 
tenets of the single-elite creed states essentially that: 
Regardless of what kind of social system is evident 
or what form of political or economic ideology is 
proclaimed~ a relatively small number of people 
always rules despite opposition (Presthus, 1974, p. 331). 
If this theory can garner adequate empirical evidence, then the 
contention by plural-elite theorists that public policy at any 
given time is the equilibrium reached in the group struggle must 
be rejected. Without any reservations, the author of this 
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study argues that the decision by OUC to continue building its 
power plant, with the backing of the city of Orlando, in no way 
reflected the "equilibrium" plural-elitists reportedly have found 
operating in the political arena. 
At no time during the three-year struggle between OUC and 
critics had there been any indication of group equilibrium. In 
fact, there was absolutely no mutual dialogue between the feuding 
parties. Their only face-to-face meeting was in court. 
Though group participation might have had positive side 
effects on OUC's subsequent actions, it certainly did not influence 
the utility's decision on the power plant. 
Graham Wootton's (1985, p. 309) observation of group influence 
on public policy seems to be an accurate appraisal of the extent to 
to which OUC critics impact the utility's plant decision. "The 
bewildering struggle of advocacy groups," Wootton writes, "might 
achieve catharsis rather than the substance of policy." 
Like Wootton's view, similar arguments presented by other 
social scientists underscore the minimal impact of opposition 
groups on decision makers. Lester Malbraith (1963, p. 354), for 
example, claims that group activities rarely alter the course of 
government actions. "Observations of governmental decision-making 
have concluded that the overall impact of group lobbying is 
relatively minor," Malbraith notes. 
It is this author's opinion that despite the odds against 
the power plant critics, they might have fared better in the 
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struggle had they been more attuned to the rules of the political 
game that was being played by OUC and its supporters. 
Throughout the campaign, OUC adamantly demonstrated that 
there was little direct public control of its actions--at least 
in this case. The utility and its allies could not have made 
it any clearer that it was economic considerations and not the 
quest to appear democratic which ultimately influenced their 
decision on the coal-fired plant. This was the crux of the matter, 
but somehow it eluded critics. So while the utility built its 
defense primarily around 11 technocracy 11 --emphasizing the primacy 
of technical expertise in deciding the fate of the coal plant--
opponents harped on the need for democracy in the decision-making 
process-mass participation, an elected OUC board and revision of 
the city charter. 
Had plant critics capitalized more on the fact that OUC 
supporters showed no respect for general-public sentiments, 
more voters probably would have dissapproved of the .power plant. 
Considering, on the other hand, the impact of . other variables, 
such as alienation and apathy on voter behavior, it is possible, 
too, that the outcome of the struggle would have been the same. 
Besides, as mentioned earlier, plant critics lacked funds and 
therefore could not have fully exploited th~ numerous tactics 
they could have employed to fight OUC and its allies. 
Additionally, the author notes that the vast majority--if 
not all--the members of the opposition groups, especially the 
the leaders, were from the lower-upper and middle classes of 
society,--attorneys, business people and city officials, among 
them. How this affected their perception of the masses they 
purportedly represented is not known. Neither has it been 
determined from this study how the general public perceived 
their self-nominated advocates. 
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Also noteworthy is the relatively low profile given critics 
to the fact that a disproportionate number of the individuals and 
groups supporting the power plant were from out of state. What 
this investigation suggests about local leadership and 
representation is a question yet to be addressed by opponents. 
Highlighting some of the positive effects of the struggle 
over the coal-fired plant, an Orlando Sentinel editor states that 
"the most positive thing to come out of this fierce debate has been 
a stronger commitment by OUC to promote energy conservation'' 
(Healy, The Orlando Sentinel, September 6, 1984, p. A-18). 
Additionally, the paper claims that "If nothing else it (the 
debate) has taught OUC that it cannot run over its customers and 
shut them out of the decision-making process" (The Orlando Sentinel, 
August 22, 1984, p. A-14) 
The activities of the various advocacy groups, and OUC's 
response to their challenges also lend suppo~t to the single-
elite postulate that the citizenry as a whole is powerless. 
Whether intentionally or not, OUC officials, on numerous 
occasions, alluded to this condition of powerlessness of the 
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masses. Steve Willis, a utility spokesman, perhaps provided the 
best demonstration of the subordinate position to which OUC's 
92,000 customers had been relegated. 
According to Willis, the utility was under no obligtion to 
justify the construction _of the plant to its customers. '1The 
people we have to prove the plant to are the state Cabinet," 
Willis states. "We really don't see a need for countering their 
r 
(critics) claim 1' (Abrahams, .The Orlando Sentinel, May 2, 
p. B-1). 
Not only has Willis' statement underscored the political 
impotence of OUC's customers in deciding the plant's future, 
but it also suggests a compelling mutuality and cohesion among 
the dominant group who are the decision makers. 
From the single-elitist standpoint, OUC's systematic 
exclusion of the masses from fully participating in the power-
plant deliberations, not only rendered the latter powerless, but 
also stripped them of self-respect. For according ~o Mills (1959, 
pp. 3-44), one's participation in decision-making is the essence 
of power and self-respect. 
To counter Mill's argument, one might argue that the OUC 
board of directors and the related decision-making bodies needed 
not consult with or solicit input from customers, since these 
decision makers were elected by the people to represent them. But 
considering that most of the individuals and agencies ruling on the 
power--from the OUC board members down to the environmental 
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agencies--had not been elected by the public, one is therefore 
inclined to question the legitimacy of OUC's action and the meaning 
of democracy, as it relates to public-service establishments such 
as OUC. 
In fact, this was one of the primary bases of the opposition 
launched ·by critics against the power plant. The question 
opponents posed was: Should a small group of what they call 
business and soci~l elites, selected by their peers, be entrusted 
to make decisions having major consequences on thousands of 
residents? 
Ironically though, while a small and vocal minority agitated 
for changes in the OUC's organizational structure, the vast 
majority of people, in whose behalf the advocates purportedly 
worked, remained quiescent. The signing of the petition, calling 
for the referendum on the plant, was the only demonstration of 
mass participation in the issue under study. 
If plural-elite theorists are correct, then, this phenomenon 
must be interpreted as a function of "organizational constraints 
and mass apathy," assumed to "deter the activism of large numbers 
of people." Marger (1981, p. 50) argues that mass participation, from 
the plural-elitist standpoint, is seen not as a desirable goal for 
which to strive, but as a potential threat to the continued 
. stability of the sociopolitical system." If the uninformed 
masses participate in large numbers, democratic self-restraint 
will break down and peaceful competition among elites--the central 
element in the elite-pluralist theory--will become impossible." 
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OUC's resistance to attempts by critics to incite widespread 
public participation in the power plant decision bears close 
resemblance to the plural-elitists' fear here described by 
Marger. The utility's apparent indifference to mass participation 
remains a nagging concern of this author. 
Why did company officials constantly emphasize that the 
referendum would have nothing to do with whether or not 
construction of t~e plant would be continued? Why did OUC proceed 
with building the facility, awa·rding as much as $155 million in 
contracts even before the plant had been approved? To have 
insisted that a public vote on the issue would not have altered 
the utility's plans for the power facility again, generates 
questions on the meaning of democracy. Most importantly, this 
position points to the locus of power in the Orlando community, 
at least on an issue such as this: power resides in the hands of 
the few, and the many are rigidly restricted in their attempts to 
modify this power. 
On the question of why the OUC proceeded to award as many 
contracts as it did before the plant was approved, one can almost 
without reservation, interpret this as a major strategy used by 
utility officials to apply pressure to decision makers to rule in 
OUC's favor. In fact, this was one of the arguments both the 
utility and its supporters highlighted in their media campaign--
with so much money already invested, "it is too late to stop 
now" (Nesbitt, Simmons, The Orlando Sentinel, November 13, 
1983, p. A-6). 
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The data presented in this study, however, alone, does not 
provide a solid enough basis for making conclusive pronouncements 
on the Orlando power structure. Nevertheless, based on the 
operational definitions of power discussed in Chapter I, the 
author of this paper believes his findings do fit some of the 
theoretical patterns espoused by the single-elitist school of 
thought. There is, for example, no question that the idea for 
the Curtis H. Stanton Energy Center originated not with OUC's 
customers, but rather with the utility's consultants--men 
occupying what Polsby calls the "apex of the power pyramid" 
(Polsby, 1980, p. 10). Also, like the elites described by single-
elite theorists, OUC decision makers were able to prevail in the 
fight for the power plant, not necessarily because of their 
superior knowledge or intelligence, but rather by virtue of their 
positions in the sociopolitical system. Their high degree of 
coherence and group consciousness were part and parcel of the 
process by which their opponents were defeated. 
The overwhelming and prompt response of business people 
nationwide to Energy for Tomorrow's call for help to fight 
Stanton's critics is perhaps the most remarkable demonstration of 
group solidarity. Equally noteworthy was the zeal with which some 
of the corporations which had secured contracts on the new OUC 
plant came out in defense of these economic interests. 
Westinghouse, for example, fearing that any opposition to the 
plant might have jeopardized its $27 million contract, went as far 
as joining OUC in its legal battles with critics. Though this 
may be but one example, the Westinghouse case does fit the mold 
of the self-serving, intertwined elite scenario portrayed by 
Mills, Meisel and other single-elite theorists. The distinction 
between their private need and the public good disappears in the 
assertion that they are one and the same thing. 
Similarly, a small group of individuals, functi6ning in a 
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system resembling what Miils (.1956, p. 343) calls the 11 vertically-
structured elite-dominated political and social system," was 
the dominant group participating and subsequently prevailing in 
the power-plant decision-making process. The question of who will 
ultimately benefit most from the construction of the power plant, 
the author believes cannot be given a definitive answer at this 
point in time. However, the evidence in this study indicates that 
the immediate benefits from the Stanton Energy Center will be 
reaped not by OUC customers, but rather by financiers, labor 
unions, large corporations, and contractors. 
APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OUTLINE OF CRITICAL DECISIONS AND 








OUC decided to build the new coal-fired plant 
"to meet future energy demands," based on Black 
and Veatch' s ·recommendation. 
A 3,280-acre site in southeast Orange County was 
chosen for the plant. 
Westinghouse Electric ·corporation was hired to 
build a turbine generator for the 415-megawatt 
power facility. 
OUC presented environmental-impact statement to 
the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. 
The Public Service Commission certified need 
for the plant. 
Orange County Judge George Diamantis validated 
$700 million in bonds that OUC planned to sell 
to finance plant construction. 
Orlando resident William Hall filed a suit in 
Orange County Circuit Court, challenging OUC's 
right to issue the bonds. Hall asked that 
validation proceedings be reopened. 
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November 1982: State hearing officer reviewed environmental 
reports, and recommended that Governor Graham 






(1) Graham and the Cabinet gave final approval 
for the power plant; (2) Orange County Circuit 
Judge Richard Cooper denied Hall's motion to reopen 
bond-validation proceedings; (3) The Committee to 
Stop the Coal Plant--forerunner of P.O.W.E.R. Now--
organized and started a petition to let Orlando 
residents vote on the plant. 
Hall appealed his case to the Florida Supreme 
Court. The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit in the 
5th District Court of Appeal in Daytona Beach 
against OUC to reopen need-certification hearings 
for the plant. 
Florida Supreme Court upheld validation of OUC 
bonds, on the ground that Hall's challenge was 
filed late. 
Orlando City Council refused to hold a vote on 
the plant after P.O.W.E.R. Now presented a 
petition signed by over 12,000 residents, calling 
for a referendum on the plant. 
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Central Florida Young 
Republicans sued Orlando to force a referendum 
on the power plant; (2) The 5th District Court 
of Appeal ruled against the Sierra Club; (3) the 
group's request for a new hearing on the plant 
was denied. 
September 1983: The Sierra Club asked the appeal court for a 
rehearing. 
October 1983: An Orange County Judge dismissed the suit by 
P.O.W.E.R. Now and the Young Republicans; 
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(2) The 5th District Court of Appeal denied the 
Sierra Club a rehearing in the plant certification; 
(3) P.O.W.E.R. Now took its case for a vote on the 
OUC plant to the 5th District Court of Appeal; 
(4) Site preparation for the plant began. 
May 1894: The 5th District Court of Appeal ruled for the 
referendum on the plant. 
September 1984: Referendum held. 
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